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GLOBAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Robert V. Percival*
Abstract: This Article explores three areas in which globalization is profoundly affecting
the development of a global environmental law. First, countries increasingly are borrowing
law and regulatory innovations from one another to respond to common environmental
problems. Although this is not an entirely new phenomenon, it is occurring at an
unprecedented pace. Second, lawsuits seeking to hold companies liable for environmental
harm they have caused outside their home countries are raising new questions concerning the
appropriate venue for such transnational liability litigation and the standards courts should
apply for enforcement of foreign judgments. Third, nongovernmental organizations are
playing an increasingly important role in influencing corporate behavior by promoting
greater informational disclosure and transparency to mobilize informed consumers.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 580
I. WHAT IS GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW? ...................... 582
II. EMERGING TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATORY NORMS ............................................................. 584
A. The Search for an Elusive Post-Kyoto Global Response
to Climate Change ................................................................ 586
B. Control of Emissions from Global Maritime Operations ..... 592
1. Efforts to Promote Further Reductions in
Emissions from Ships ............................................... 593
2. IMO Consideration of a Global Approach to
Reduce Ship Emissions............................................. 597
C. Global Consensus on Unreasonably Dangerous Products:
Asbestos and Gasoline Lead Additives ................................ 599
III. TRANSNATIONAL LIABILITY LITIGATION ......................... 601
A. Efforts by Foreign Governments to Hold U.S. Tobacco
Companies Liable................................................................. 602
B. Litigation Against Chevron for Oil Pollution in Ecuador .... 605
1. Litigation Overview .................................................. 606
2. Chevron’s RICO Lawsuit and the Battle over
“Crude” Outtakes ...................................................... 608
3. Arbitration Suits Filed by Chevron at the
Permanent Court of Arbitration ................................ 610

* Robert F. Stanton Professor of Law & Director of the Environmental Law Program, University of
Maryland School of Law. The author would like to thank Peter Hogge, Esther Houseman, Molly
Madden, and Megan Marzec for their research assistance with this article.

579

WLR_October_Percival_FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

580

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

10/21/2011 1:19 PM

[Vol. 86:579

4. Judicial Recusal and Judgment in the Ecuador
Trial Court ................................................................ 611
5. Chevron’s Efforts to Block Enforcement of the
Ecuadoran Judgment ................................................. 613
C. Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corporation................... 616
D. Transnational DBCP Litigation ............................................ 618
E. The Trafigura Litigation ..................................................... 621
IV. PRIVATE TRANSNATIONAL TRANSPARENCY
INITIATIVES ................................................................................ 624
A. The Equator Principles ......................................................... 625
B. Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil .................................... 626
C. NGO-Private Partnerships and Efforts to Promote “Green
Supply Chains”..................................................................... 629
CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 633

INTRODUCTION
As this symposium confirms, the concept of “global law” has
sufficiently matured that the term “global law” may no longer need to
appear in quotation marks. This change reflects the profound effect
globalization is having on the development of law and legal systems
throughout the world, particularly in the environmental law field. As
global environmental law develops, traditional distinctions between
domestic and international law, and private and public law, are blurring.
This Article discusses the concept of global environmental law and
then explores three areas in which globalization is profoundly affecting
its development: adoption of transnational regulatory norms,
transnational litigation, and transparency initiatives. Part I briefly
explains the phrase “global environmental law” and its growing use. Part
II discusses how countries increasingly borrow law and regulatory
innovations from one another and adopt their own approaches to respond
to common environmental problems. Although this is not an entirely
new phenomenon, it is occurring at an unprecedented pace, at least in
part because transnational regulatory norms to protect the environment
are no longer developed primarily in a “top down” manner through
multilateral consensus agreements. As this Part explains, this
development is reflected in the outcomes of the 2009 Copenhagen and
2010 Cancún climate change negotiations that failed to produce a long
sought-after global agreement to control emissions of greenhouse gases
(GHGs). The Part also explores the regional movement to create global
norms to regulate emissions of air pollutants from international maritime
operations. It then discusses how countries are increasingly learning
from one another and borrowing regulatory standards. This advancement
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is illustrated by the global growth of bans on unreasonably dangerous
products, such as asbestos and gasoline lead additives. As countries learn
from the experience of others, regulatory innovations with diffuse
origins are spreading more rapidly around the globe.
Part III examines the growth of transnational liability litigation as
another source of emerging global law, as parties seek to hold companies
liable for environmental harm they have caused outside their home
countries. These lawsuits are raising new questions concerning the
appropriate venue for such transnational liability litigation and the
standards courts should apply for enforcement of foreign judgments.
This Part focuses primarily on the rapidly metastasizing global litigation
between residents of the oil-polluted Oriente region of Ecuador and the
Chevron Corporation. In February 2011, this litigation, which initially
had been filed in the United States during the early 1990s, ultimately
produced the largest environmental judgment in history—an $18 billion
judgment against Chevron issued by a court in Ecuador. This Part also
examines litigation by workers in Central American banana plantations
who allegedly were rendered sterile by exposure to Dibromo-3Chloropropane (DBCP), a pesticide banned in the United States because
of its reproductive toxicity, and litigation against the British trading firm,
Trafigura, for dumping toxic waste on a beach in the Côte d’Ivoire. Each
of these cases reflects a new global legal landscape where poor plaintiffs
from developing countries are seeking to hold accountable wealthy and
powerful corporations that previously would be immune from challenge.
Part IV reviews emerging quasi-public/quasi-private global
transparency and disclosure initiatives championed by nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and private enterprises in collaboration with
regulatory authorities. This Part explores how NGOs are playing an
increasingly important role in influencing corporate behavior by
promoting greater informational disclosure and transparency to mobilize
informed consumers. These include the Equator Principles governing
funding of development projects by multinational banks, the Roundtable
on Sustainable Palm Oil, and the Sustainable Apparel Coalition. These
initiatives, as well as the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Financial Reform
legislation’s disclosure provisions concerning conflict minerals and
payments to foreign governments, are promoting a new corporate ethic
for assessing the environmental implications of development projects
and “greening” the supply chains of multinational enterprises.
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WHAT IS GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW?

In my previous scholarship I explored the concept of global
environmental law and the forces contributing to its emergence.1 In this
work I maintain that global environmental law is a useful concept to
describe how environmental law is developing throughout the world
without seeking rigidly to separate the field into domestic and
international, or public and private environmental law.
“Global law” and “global environmental law” now have become part
of the popular lexicon. This assertion is illustrated by Figures I and II
that display the relative frequency with which these terms appeared in
English-language books from 1940 to 2008, as revealed through use of
Google’s Ngram research tool.2 These figures demonstrate that the
frequency with which both terms were used surged during the 1990s.

1. See generally Robert V. Percival, Liability for Environmental Harm and Emerging Global
Environmental Law, 25 MD. J. INT’L L. 37 (2010); Robert V. Percival, The Globalization of
Environmental Law, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 451 (2009); Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The
Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615 (2009).
2. This tool enables researchers to determine the frequency with which various terms appear in
the enormous database of books scanned by Google. Books Ngram Viewer, GOOGLE,
http://ngrams.googlelabs.com/info (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
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FIGURE I. FREQUENCY OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE TERM “GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW” IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE BOOKS FROM 1940 TO
20083

FIGURE II. FREQUENCY OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE TERM “GLOBAL
LAW” IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE BOOKS FROM 1940 TO 20084

3. Jean-Baptiste Michel, Yuan Kui Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres, Matthew K. Gray,
William Brockman, The Google Books Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter
Norvig, John Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A. Nowak & Erez Lieberman Aiden, Google Ngram
Viewer, GOOGLE, http://ngrams.googlelabs.com (last visited Sept. 19, 2011); see also Jean-Baptiste
Michel et al., Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books, SCIENCE, Jan. 14,
2011, at 176.
4. Michel et al., supra note 3.
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The use of the term “global environmental law” appears to better
capture the complex realities of current developments in the
environmental law field, because traditional disciplinary distinctions
between domestic and international law, and between private and public
law, continue to erode, as demonstrated below. Among the factors
contributing to this phenomenon are the greater connectedness of civil
society throughout the world,5 growth of international trade and
multinational corporate enterprises, increased concern for the
environment throughout the world, and greater global collaboration
between environmental officials and NGOs. As multinational companies
push for greater harmonization of regulatory standards, NGOs are
assisting regulators to improve transboundary enforcement.6 Despite the
current anti-environmental fervor of the Republican-controlled U.S.
House of Representatives,7 global concern for the environment has
surged to a point where a company’s environmental neglect in any
remote corner of the world is unlikely to pass without notice in its home
venue. As a result, norms defining acceptable corporate behavior are
converging, even in jurisdictions that have not formally updated their
regulatory standards. Whether one believes that globalization or the
current evolutionary path of legal norms is desirable or undesirable,
global law is here to stay.
II.

EMERGING TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATORY NORMS

The increasing integration of the global economy has given greater
force to the need for harmonization and coordination of national
regulatory policies. For example, following the global financial crisis of

5. This central feature of globalization—improvements in communication technology and the rise
of the internet—was popularized by journalist Thomas L. Friedman in his book THE WORLD IS
FLAT (2005).
6. MAKING LAW WORK: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE & SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 553–54
(Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 2005), available at
http://www.inece.org/mlw/Chapter6_NGOComplianceStrategies.pdf.
7. Paul Quinlan, ‘Anti-Environmental’ House Freshman Leads Charge Against Obama’s Clean
Water Agenda, N.Y. TIMES GREEN, (May 3, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/03/03greenwire-anti-environmental-house-freshman-leadscharge-98149.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2011); see also Dina Fine Maron & Saqib Rahim,
Democrats Mount Rear-Guard Action Against Republican Assault on EPA Climate Rules, N.Y.
TIMES GREEN (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/02/17/17climatewiredemocrats-mount-rear-guard-action-against-re-29952.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2011); Kate
Sheppard, The Most Anti-Environment Congress Ever?, MOTHER JONES BLUE MARBLE (Sept. 12,
2011, 12:36 PM), http://motherjones.com/blue-marble/2011/09/most-anti-environment-congressever.
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2008, particular effort was made to strengthen coordination of global
economic policy.8 This was achieved in part by broadening the
representation on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to
include representation from each of the members of the G-20 major
economies of the world.9 In addition, the Basel Committee adopted
Basel III regulatory standards to govern capital adequacy and liquidity of
banks.10 The Basel negotiations illustrate a trend that is occurring in
environmental areas as well—multilateral treaties are being
deemphasized in favor of informal agreements on coordinated regulatory
policies.11
Informal multilateral agreements ultimately contribute to an emerging
species of global law: transnational norms defining acceptable and
unacceptable corporate conduct. By 1999, the United Nations listed a
total of 229 multilateral treaties relating to the environment, a significant
jump from the forty-seven environmental treaties that existed through
1970.12 However, many now believe that we have passed the high point
of global efforts to negotiate multilateral treaties to address the planet’s
environmental problems.13 To be sure, negotiations continue on some
important global environmental treaties, including an effort to create a
legally binding instrument on global mercury emissions.14 However, the
negotiation of new international treaties no longer seems to be the
primary focal point of developing global environmental law.15 Replacing
it is a new paradigm: countries increasingly emphasize bilateral
negotiations and informal efforts to coordinate regulatory policies and to

8. Press Release, Basel Comm., Initiatives in Response to the Crisis by the Basel Comm. (Mar.
30, 2009), http://www.bis.org/press/p090330.htm.
9. Press Release, Basel Comm., Basel Committee Broadens its Membership (June 10, 2009),
http://www.bis.org/press/p090610.htm. This included adding Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa, and Turkey as well as Hong Kong SAR and Singapore. Id.
10. Press Release, Basel Comm., Basel III Rules Text and Results of the Quantitative Impact
Study Issued by the Basel Committee (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.bis.org/press/p101216.htm.
11. See David Doniger, The Copenhagen Accord: A Big Step Forward, SWITCHBOARD (Dec. 21,
2009), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/ddoniger/the_copenhagen_accord_a_big_st.html
(suggesting that the formal negotiating process under the UNFCCC has failed).
12. Environmental
Law
Instruments,
UNITED
NATIONS
ENV’T
PROGRAMME,
http://hqweb.unep.org/Law/Law_instruments/index_complete_list.asp (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
13. See Robert Falkner et al., International Climate Policy after Copenhagen: Towards a
‘Building Blocks’ Approach, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y 252, 252 (2010), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00045.x/full.
14. See, e.g., Melanie Ashton et al., EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable
Dev.) (June 8, 2010), http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb2802e.pdf.
15. Falkner et al., supra note 13.
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borrow regulatory innovations from one another.16 As the rest of this
section demonstrates, this paradigm shift is illustrated by how the
nations of the world are responding to the problems of (1) climate
change, (2) air pollution from global maritime operations, and (3)
unreasonably dangerous substances such as asbestos and gasoline lead
additives.
A.

The Search for an Elusive Post-Kyoto Global Response to Climate
Change

Beginning with the first United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972, the nations of the world
convene global “earth summits” at ten-year intervals.17 Interest and
participation has increased over the years. Although 113 nations
attended the summit in Stockholm,18 178 nations attended the 1992 Rio
Earth Summit.19 At the Rio conference, the U.N. Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed,20 setting in motion a process
designed to culminate in legally binding limits on global emissions of
GHGs. The U.S. Senate quickly ratified the UNFCCC in October
1992.21
Following the success of the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, there was considerable optimism that a
similar approach could be used successfully to combat climate change.22
Things started out well. In December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the
UNFCCC was adopted, specifying modest reductions in GHG emissions

16. Id.
17. The History of Sustainable Development in the United Nations, U.N. CONF. ON SUSTAINABLE
DEV., http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/index.php?menu=22 (last visited Aug. 28, 2011) (discussing
Rio Earth Summit of 1992 and Johannesburg Earth Summit of 2002); see also About Rio+20, U.N.
CONF. ON SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/index.php?menu=17 (last visited
Aug. 28, 2011) (discussing the June 2012 Conference on Sustainable Development to take place in
Brazil).
18. Stockholm 1972 - Participants, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME,
http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1519&l=en
(last visited June 2, 2011).
19. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 12 ENCYCLOPÆDIA
BRITANNICA MICROPÆDIA 149 (15th ed. 2010) (“The Earth Summit was the largest gathering of
world leaders in history.”).
20. Id.
21. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Apr. 14,
2011), http://epa.gov/climatechange/policy/international_unfccc.html.
22. C. Boyden Gray, Copenhagen Failure vs. Montreal Success, ATLANTIC COUNCIL NEW
ATLANTICIST POL’Y & ANALYSIS BLOG (Dec. 9, 2009),
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/copenhangen-failure-vs-montreal-success.
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below a 1990 emissions baseline that developed countries were to
achieve during the period from 2008 to 2012.23 Action on emissions
controls for developing countries was deferred out of considerations of
fairness because these countries had contributed so little to the existing
buildup of GHGs in the atmosphere.24
But things soon went wrong. Although it was understood that rapidly
developing countries like China and India would have to commit to
controlling their GHG emissions in the future,25 President George W.
Bush used the failure of the Kyoto Protocol to require China or India to
reduce their emissions of GHGs as a justification for withdrawing U.S.
assent to the Kyoto Protocol.26 Shortly after taking office, he also
repudiated a campaign pledge to support legislation to control emissions
of carbon dioxide.27 President George W. Bush’s retraction undercut his
new Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator, Christie
Todd Whitman, who had just returned from an international conference
of environmental ministers in Trieste, where she had assured her
counterparts that the United States would act to control its GHG
emissions.28 As the expiration date of the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance
period approaches at the end of 2012, it has proven impossible to reach a
global consensus on a new treaty to combat climate change.
This was confirmed at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP-15) to
the UNFCCC held in Copenhagen in December 2009. Participants in a
Conference of the Parties (COP-13) held in Bali in December 2007
adopted the “Bali Road Map” to establish a timetable for negotiating a
successor to the Kyoto Protocol.29 This adoption set a timetable for
completing a new global agreement by the end of 2009.30 However, in
the months before the Copenhagen Conference in December 2009, it
23. Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
24. Id.
25. See Climate Change: The Big Emitters, BBC NEWS (July 4, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/3143798.stm (noting the sharp increase in emissions from
China and India).
26. See David E. Sanger, Bush Seeks Middle Ground on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES (June 11,
2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/11/world/11CND-PREXY.html.
27. BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY 82–85, 88–90 (2008).
28. Id. Gellman reports that Cheney engineered this stunning policy reversal by carefully
excluding EPA and the State Department from having any input into the decision and ensuring that
Bush would sign the confirming document minutes before Whitman and the Secretary of State
arrived at the White House to protest.
29. The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
30. Id.
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became apparent that a comprehensive global agreement to limit all
significant sources of GHG emissions would be very difficult to achieve,
particularly because of continuing disagreements between developed and
developing nations.31 In early September 2009 the government of India
released a report projecting that India’s emissions of GHGs could
quadruple over the next twenty years.32 But, India’s Environment
Minister Jairam Ramesh emphasized that on a per capita basis India’s
emissions would remain below the per capita emissions of developed
countries.33 Five independent studies released by India’s government
project that the country’s emissions will rise from 1.4 billion tons in
2008 to between 4 billion and 7.3 billion tons in 2031.34 The country’s
per capita emissions are forecast to rise to between 2.77 and nearly 5
tons per capita compared to a global average of 4.22 tons per capita in
2005.35 At the same time, Chinese economists released a study
concluding that it would cost China $438 billion annually to reduce the
country’s GHG emissions in 2030.36
Further progress has stalled. At the Asian-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) summit in Singapore in November 2009, President
Obama agreed to a proposal by Lars Løkke Rasmussen, the prime
minister of Denmark, to postpone seeking a new, legally binding global
treaty to reduce emissions of GHGs at the Copenhagen climate
conference.37 The decision reflected the reality that insufficient progress
has been made in preliminary negotiating sessions to prepare the way for
a global consensus on a new treaty. Instead, participants in the
Copenhagen summit agreed they would try to save face by announcing a
“political agreement” on GHG controls, leaving many difficult issues to
be resolved in subsequent negotiations.38 Some argued that this delay

31. Tom Zeller Jr., Ahead of Copenhagen Climate Talks, Voices of Hope and Discord, N.Y.
TIMES GREEN, (Nov. 10, 2009, 4:21 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/10/ahead-ofcopenhagen-climate-talks-voices-of-hope-and-discord.
32. James Lamont et al., India’s Growth Set to Lift Emissions Fourfold, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 3,
2009, at 3.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Kathrin Hille & Fiona Harvey, China’s High Price for Cuts in Emissions, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 2,
2009, at 6.
37. David Adam et al., No Deal, We’re Out of Time, Obama Warns, GUARDIAN, Nov. 16, 2009,
at 1; see also Jonathan Watts, Copenhagen Climate Summit Hopes Fade as Obama Backs
Postponement, GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2009),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/nov/15/obama-copenhagen-emissions-targetsclimate-change.
38. Watts, supra note 37.
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would enable the 192 nations participating in the negotiations to “get it
right” rather than being pressured into hasty compromises at
Copenhagen.39
In the hopes of reigniting progress, leaders of particular countries
announced their own standards to combat global climate change. For
example, a week before the Copenhagen Conference, both the United
States and China revealed what they were willing to do to reduce their
emissions of GHGs. In line with the Waxman–Markey Bill40 that passed
the House in June 2009, President Obama announced that the United
States would promise to reduce its GHG emissions by seventeen percent
below 2005 levels by 2020.41 He also promised to attend part of the
Copenhagen Conference while on his way to Sweden to accept the
Nobel Peace Prize.42 China announced that Premier Wen Jiabao would
attend the Copenhagen Conference.43 While China did not pledge to
reduce the absolute level of its GHG emissions, it announced that it
would seek to reduce the “carbon intensity” of its economy (levels of
carbon dioxide emissions per unit of gross domestic product) by forty to
forty-five percent by 2020.44
Observers viewed both the U.S. and Chinese pledges in glass-halfempty/glass-half-full terms. They represented progress in the sense that
for the first time both nations—the two largest emitters of GHGs in the
world—made serious promises to the international community to start
controlling their emissions. Yet the pledges were disappointing to many
environmentalists because they clearly were inadequate to achieve the
G-20’s previously announced goal of containing global warming to no
more than two degrees Celsius.45 While the United States had proposed

39. Id.
40. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
41. Press Release, White House, President to Attend Copenhagen Climate Talks (Nov. 25, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-attend-copenhagen-climate-talks.
42. Darren Samuelsohn & Lisa Friedman, Obama Announces 2020 Emissions Target, Dec. 9
Copenhagen Visit, N.Y. TIMES GREEN (Nov. 25, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/11/25/25climatewire-obama-announces-2020-emissionstarget-dec-9-22088.html.
43. Associated Press, China Vows to Slow Carbon Emissions Growth, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 26,
2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34160921/ns/us_news-environment/t/china-vows-slowcarbon-emissions-growth.
44. Id.
45. Ben Webster, Proposed Cuts in CO2 Can’t Stop a Catastrophe, Says Lord Stern, TIMES
(London), Dec. 7, 2009, at 7; see also Ben Webster, Copenhagen Emissions Targets ‘Not Enough to
Avert
Catastrophic
Warming,’
TIMES
(London)
(Dec.
7,
2009),
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article6946675.ece; Jeffery Frankel, The
Copenhagen Accord: Real Progress Through 2020 Emission Goals?, E. ASIA F. (Mar. 19, 2010),
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to the Chinese leadership that the two countries package their proposals
together as part of a “G-2” effort to influence the Copenhagen
negotiations, the Chinese insisted that any coordination should be done
in the larger context of the G-20.46
Representatives from 193 countries participated in the Copenhagen
Conference and 119 heads of state attended, including President Obama,
who made the most of his brief time there by inserting himself into a
meeting with the leaders of China, Brazil, India, and South Africa.47
Obama’s personal effort helped produce “The Copenhagen Accord,”48
an agreement between the United States and leaders of these rapidly
developing countries that was applauded by most, but not all of the other
countries.49 The Accord recognizes “the scientific view that the increase
in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius”50 and calls for
consideration by 2015 of strengthening this long-term goal to 1.5
degrees Celsius.51 Developed countries “commit to implement”
economy-wide GHG emissions reductions by 2020, while developing
countries will implement “[n]ationally appropriate mitigation actions.”52
These reductions and actions were to be identified and reflected in
submissions to the Conference of the Parties by January 31, 2010.53 In
the face of objections from Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan, Tuvalu,
and Venezuela, the Conference of the Parties simply agreed to “take
note” of the Copenhagen Accord, rather than formally adopting it.54

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/19/the-copenhagen-accord-real-progress-through-2020emission-goals.
46. China Rejects G2, Short-Term Funds, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 12, 2009),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-12/12/content_9165554.htm.
47. David Corn & Kate Sheppard, Obama’s Copenhagen Deal, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 18, 2009,
5:46 PM), http://motherjones.com/environment/2009/12/obamas-copenhagen-deal.
48. The text of the Accord is provided in U.N. Climate Change Conference 2009, Copenhagen,
Den., Dec. 7–19, 2009, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Sess.,
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord], available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf.
49. Heather Allen, Countries Pull Together in Final Hours of Copenhagen, SWITCHBOARD (Dec.
19, 2009), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/hallen/countries_pull_together_in_the.html.
50. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 48, at 5.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 6.
53. Id.
54. Four Countries Hold Up Copenhagen Accord, DECCAN HERALD (Dec. 19, 2009),
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/42118/four-countries-hold-up-copenhagen.html; John M.
Broder, Climate Goal Is Supported by China and India, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at A9,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/science/earth/10climate.html.
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The outcome of the Copenhagen Conference reflects changing global
political realities. China, Brazil, and India are now vitally important to
the success of any global effort to control emissions of GHGs because of
their rapidly growing economies and corollary GHG contributions. Their
interests no longer are entirely congruent with the rest of the G-77
developing countries. China now is the world’s leading emitter of
GHGs, emitting 7.7 billion tons of carbon dioxide in 2009, compared to
5.4 billion tons by the United States, which is second in absolute terms.55
However, in per-capita terms China’s emissions are only about one-third
those of the United States.56
Although virtually all 193 nations agreed that climate change
represents a global crisis that demands fundamental changes in the
world’s energy infrastructure, their failure to produce a legally binding
document mandating these changes reflects another global political
reality—international law is moving away from multilateral consensus
agreements due to the lack of a global enforcement infrastructure. As
discussed above, developing instead is a kind of “global law”; countries
now borrow law from one another and a few principal approaches to
common problems emerge.
Everyone understood the inadequacy of the commitments that were
announced in Copenhagen.57 This understanding itself was a positive
development even if the failure to achieve more dramatic emission
reduction commitments was disappointing to most observers. As the
damaging effects of climate change become more visible, domestic
political support for more dramatic action is likely to grow in many
countries, even if it is unlikely that a legally binding international treaty
will be adopted.
While much of the global press portrayed Copenhagen as a failure,
some environmentalists disputed this assessment, arguing that it made a
necessary end run around obstructionist countries that rendered the
consensus-driven COP process ineffective.58 Shortly after the
55. Mark McCormick & Paul Scruton, An Atlas of Pollution: The World in Carbon Dioxide
Emissions, GUARDIAN, http://image.guardian.co.uk/sysfiles/Guardian/documents/2011/02/10/CarbonWeb.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
56. Simon Rogers & Lisa Evans, World Carbon Dioxide Emissions Data by Country: China
Speeds Ahead of the Rest, GUARDIAN DATA BLOG (Jan. 31, 2011, 2:30 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jan/31/world-carbon-dioxide-emissions-countrydata-co2.
57. See John Vidal et al., Low Targets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 19, 2009, at 1, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal.
58. For example, David Doniger, Policy Director for the Natural Resources Defense Council’s
Climate Center, hailed the Copenhagen Accord as “a big step forward” and disputed arguments that
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Copenhagen Conference adjourned, Yvo de Boer, the U.N. official who
was in charge of the talks, called for an end to “fingerpointing” and
“recriminations.”59 His statement was widely viewed as a rebuke to
British Climate Minister Ed Miliband, who had blamed China for
blocking greater progress at Copenhagen, sparking an angry response
from Chinese officials.60
A major question following the Copenhagen Accord was how many
countries would submit emission reduction commitments and nationally
appropriate mitigation actions by the January 31, 2010 deadline.
Although there was considerable concern that China and India would not
participate in this process, both the Chinese and Indian governments
transmitted letters to the United Nations agreeing to associate their
countries with the Copenhagen Accord.61 China repeated its voluntary
goal of reducing the carbon intensity of its economy by forty to fortyfive percent below 2005 levels by 2020.62 India announced an
aspirational target to reduce the carbon intensity of its economy by
twenty to twenty-five percent below 2005 levels by 2020.63 India’s
Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh stated that by listing itself as
joining the accord, the country strengthened its negotiation position on
climate change.64 As of April 2011, a total of 141 countries have agreed
to the Copenhagen Accord.65
B.

Control of Emissions from Global Maritime Operations

Even though ocean shipping is a very energy-efficient mode of
transport, ships are a significant, but as yet largely unregulated, source of
GHG emissions.66 The fuel that ships use is so dirty that it creates

it was a failure because it will not keep the global temperature rise below two degrees Celsius, it
does not mandate specific emissions cuts, and the commitments are not legally binding. Doniger,
supra note 11.
59. Fiona Harvey, UN Urges End to Climate Wrangling, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at 4,
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e7670746-efe3-11de-833d00144feab49a.html#axzz1YSpTYNEm.
60. Id.
61. Broder, supra note 54, at A9.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Copenhagen Accord, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/items/5262.php (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
66. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/GHGEmissions.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
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enormous pollution; in fact, many ships use bunker fuel with such high
sulfur content that it has been estimated that just sixteen of the world’s
largest ships can produce as much sulfur pollution as all of the world’s
cars.67 It is also estimated that international shipping accounted for 870
million tons of GHG emissions in 2007, or 2.7% of global emissions.68
Despite the significant pollution emitted by ocean-going ships, the
Kyoto Protocol and UNFCCC do not speak directly to regulation of
shipping emissions, and nations largely leave regulatory control to the
International Maritime Organization (IMO).69 But for decades the IMO
has allowed ships to burn fuel containing up to 4.5% sulfur—4500 times
more than the EU allows in gasoline.70
1.

Efforts to Promote Further Reductions in Emissions from Ships

In the absence of comprehensive environmental regulation for ships,
countries and private shipping companies have fashioned various means
to address the problem of shipping pollution. Countries have adopted
multilateral agreements, entered into regional agreements, crafted their
own regulatory standards, and one country has encouraged cooperation
with private shipping companies. In addition, at least one shipping
company has voluntarily undertaken measures to reduce its own
pollution. An example of each one of these approaches is provided
below.
First, in an attempt to reduce shipping pollution in the absence of a
comprehensive global treaty, countries have entered into multilateral
agreements, including Annex VI of the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).71 As of the end of 2010,
150 countries, representing nearly all of the world’s shipping, are parties
to MARPOL.72 Different provisions of Annex VI authorize limitations

67. Fred Pearce, How 16 Ships Create as Much Pollution as All the Cars in the World, DAILY
MAIL (London), Nov. 22, 2009, at 35, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article1229857/How-16-ships-create-pollution-cars-world.html.
68. Marine Env’t Prot. Comm., Int’l Mar. Org., Executive Summary: Prevention of Air Pollution
from Ships, Apr. 9, 2009, MEPC 59/4/7, at 6, available at
http://www5.imo.org/SharePoint/blastDataHelper.asp/data_id%3D26046/4-7.pdf.
69. See id.
70. Pearce, supra note 67.
71. IMO, International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as Modified
by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto (MARPOL): Annex VI: Prevention of Air Pollution from
Ships, http://www5.imo.org/SharePoint/contents.asp?doc_id=678&topic_id=258#11 (last visited
Aug. 28, 2011) [hereinafter MARPOL Annex VI].
72. IMO, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the
International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other
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on the release of sulfur and nitrogen oxides from ship exhaust and the
sulfur content of fuels.73 They also allow countries to petition the IMO to
establish emission control areas.74
After it proved impossible to reach a global consensus on control of
emissions from ships, countries have focused on fashioning regional
approaches to combat this problem.
For example, on March 27, 2009, the United States and Canada
petitioned the IMO to establish an emissions control area (ECA)
encompassing the countries’ coastlines.75 The U.S.–Canada proposal
was accepted in July 2009 at the 59th session of the Marine Environment
Protection Committee (MEPC) of the IMO.76 The North American ECA
received formal approval at the 60th MEPC session in March 2010, and
entered into force on August 1, 2011.77
The North American ECA establishes a 230-mile buffer zone around
the countries’ coastlines.78 While within this buffer zone, large ships will
be subject to stricter emissions standards aimed at reducing the level of
pollutants in the ships’ emissions.79 In order to achieve compliance with

Functions, at 101 (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20%202011.pdf.
73. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 71; see also IMO, International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as Modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto
(MARPOL): The Protocol of 1997,
http://www5.imo.org/SharePoint/contents.asp?doc_id=678&topic_id=258#30 (last visited Aug. 28,
2011) [hereinafter MARPOL Protocol of 1997].
74. IMO, The Protocol of 1997 (MARPOL Annex VI),
http://www.imo.org/ourwork/environment/pollutionprevention/airpollution/pages/the-protocol-of1997-%28marpol-annex-vi%29.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
75. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, U.S. Proposes to Slash Harmful Ship Emissions
Along the Nation’s Coastlines to Save Lives, (Mar. 30, 2009),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/b7129c28691a2b8
685257589005ba9af!opendocument. See generally IMO, Sulphur Oxides (SOx) – Regulation 14,
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/Sulphuroxides-%28SOx%29-%E2%80%93-Regulation-14.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2011) (describing
ECAs as of October 2010).
76. Marine Env’t Prot. Comm., IMO, Rep. on its 59th Sess., July 13–17, 2009, MEPC 59/24, at
29–30 (July 27, 2009), http://www.uscg.mil/imo/mepc/docs/mepc59-report.pdf.
77. Marine Env’t Prot. Comm., IMO, Rep. on its 60th Sess., Mar. 22–26, 2010, MEPC 60/22, at
44 (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.uscg.mil/imo/mepc/docs/mepc60-report.pdf.
78. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 75; see also Marine Env’t Prot. Comm., IMO,
Interpretations of, and Amendments to, MARPOL Sulphur Oxides and Particulate Matter, MEPC
59/6/5, Annex II (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/nonroad/marine/ci/mepc-59-ecaproposal.pdf.
79. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 75; see also Marine Env’t Prot. Comm., supra
note 78.
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the ECA, ships must use fuel with reduced sulfur content while within
the ECA.80 Additionally, starting in 2016, new ships will be subject to
advanced technologies to control NOx emissions.81 By 2020, the EPA
anticipates these stringent emissions controls in the ECA will reduce
shipping emission levels of NOx, particulate matter (PM2.5), and SOx
respectively by 320,000, 90,000, and 920,000 tons.82 The EPA estimates
that by 2020 the resulting pollution reduction could potentially save
8300 American and Canadian lives each year.83
In addition to the ECA proposal, the United States is taking other
steps to reduce shipping emissions. On April 30, 2010, the EPA issued a
final rule for large ships equivalent to the standards adopted in
amendments to Annex VI of MARPOL.84 The emissions standards will
have two stages of application. In 2011, all new engines will be required
to employ more efficient engine technology, with anticipated NOx
reductions of fifteen to twenty-five percent below current levels.85 In
2016, new engines will be required to employ high efficiency engine
technology like selective catalytic reduction to achieve NOx reductions
of eighty percent below current levels.86 In addition to these emission
standards, EPA limited the sulfur content (maximum concentration of
1000 parts per million) of fuels to be used in U.S. waters.87
After the December 2010 Cancún UNFCCC Conference failed to
reach any international agreement for reducing GHG emissions from
ships, Papua New Guinea proposed a reduction plan based on working
with the private sector. Part of the plan involved charging vessels

80. Ocean
Vessels
and
Large
Ships,
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/oceanvessels.htm [hereinafter Ocean Vessels]. From 2012 to 2014, vessels
operating within the ECA cannot use fuel with sulfur concentrations greater than 10,000 parts per
million (ppm). Id. Starting in 2015, the maximum allowable sulfur concentration in fuel is reduced
to 1000 ppm. Id. In 2016, fuels will be subject to NOx aftertreatment requirements. Id.
81. Id. NOx and SOx are terms that refer to the various oxides of nitrogen (NO, NO2) and the
various oxides of sulfur (SO2 and SO3), pollutants that can harm human health and the environment.
82. See Ocean Vessels, supra note 80.
83. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 75.
84. See Ocean Vessels, supra note 80. The standards apply to all U.S.-flagged vessels with
Category 3 marine diesel engines (engines with per-cylinder displacement of at least thirty liters).
Id.
85. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENT, EPA-420-F-09-068, EPA
FINALIZES MORE STRINGENT STANDARDS FOR CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM NEW MARINE
COMPRESSION-IGNITION ENGINES AT OR ABOVE 30 LITERS PER CYLINDER 3 (2009),
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/marine/ci/420f09068.pdf.
86. Id.
87. See Ocean Vessels, supra note 80.
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docking fees dependent on the level of carbon emitted.88 However,
negotiations toward an international agreement were again hampered by
division over application of the principle of “common but differentiated
responsibility.”89 A group of developing countries including Argentina,
Brazil, China, India, and Saudi Arabia opposed a global standard; as a
result, all language regarding shipping was removed from the
negotiating text.90
Finally, at least one private shipping company has undertaken its own
pollution reduction plan. In September 2010, the Danish firm Maersk
Line, the world’s largest container shipping company, announced that it
would voluntarily use low-sulfur fuel while at berth in the port of Hong
Kong, which handles nearly one-eighth of the world’s container ship
traffic. Along with Civic Exchange, a Hong Kong-based NGO, Maersk
urged all other Hong Kong shipping carriers to make the same
commitment.91 Maersk estimates that the switch to low-sulfur fuel will
cost an extra one million dollars a year, but that it will reduce emissions
from its ships by eighty percent.92
In addition, in February 2011, Maersk announced that it had ordered a
new fleet of the ten largest container ships ever built—ships specifically
designed to reduce carbon emissions. The ships, which will be built by
Daewoo Shipbuilding in South Korea, are to be called the “Triple E”
class because they provide economies of scale, energy efficiency, and
environmental improvements.93 Maersk estimates that the ships will
produce fifty percent less carbon emissions than existing ships operating
between Asia and Europe.94
88. See Richard Black, Shipping to Steer Cleaner Carbon Course, BBC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2010,
2:00 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-11931883. The Papua New Guinea
proposal relied on engagement with the Carbon War Room ship efficiency ratings system described
infra, note 107. Id.
89. Cancun Fails to Deliver on Ship Emissions, SEAS AT RISK (Dec. 11, 2010), http://www.seasat-risk.org/news_n2.php?page=363.
90. Id.; see also LLOYD’S REGISTER, THE OUTCOME OF COP 16 (2010),
http://www.lr.org/Images/COP16%20briefing%20note_tcm155-205773.pdf. The estimated $10
billion that would be raised by some form of carbon pricing could be devoted to developing
countries’ transition to shipping industries with low carbon footprints. Id.
91. Pamela Boykoff, Ship Firm Floats Plan to Cut Hong Kong Smog, CNN (Sept. 7, 2010, 1:39
PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/09/07/maersk.hong.kong.pollution/index.html.
92. Id.
93. John Vidal, Future of Ships: 20 Storeys Tall and 860m Bananas on Board, GUARDIAN, Feb.
22, 2011, at 15 [hereinafter Future of Ships]; see also John Vidal, Maersk Claims New ‘Mega
Containers’ Could Cut Shipping Emissions, GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2011, 4:21 PM) [hereinafter Mega
Containers],
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/feb/21/maersk-containers-shippingemissions.
94. Future of Ships, supra note 93; Mega Containers, supra note 93.
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IMO Consideration of a Global Approach to Reduce Ship
Emissions

Although for years the IMO has continued to resist efforts to adopt a
more global approach, in September 2010 the IMO’s MEPC met in
London to discuss methods and plans to reduce shipping emissions
globally.95 Developed nations represented at the meeting stressed the
importance of equal treatment of all countries as necessary for the
functional economic effect of market-based mechanisms.96 Developing
countries argued that the principle of “common but differentiated
responsibility” reflected in the UNFCCC dictates that they should bear
less of the burden of reducing emissions.97
Two technical and operational measures examined at the London
MEPC meeting included an Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) and
a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP).98 The EEDI is a
performance-based instrument that establishes a mandatory energy
efficiency level for all new ships.99 New ships can meet the required
improvements in efficiency through any future cost-effective design
measures.100 The SEEMP is a compilation of best practices for fuelefficient functioning of vessels.101 Although both the EEDI and SEEMP
are currently voluntary measures, both measures were circulated to be
considered for adoption by IMO parties at the July 2011 MEPC
meeting.102
While the London IMO meeting participants gave thorough
consideration to multiple methods that could be components of a broader
strategy to reduce shipping emissions, the parties were unable to reach

95. Will Nichols, IMO Floats Proposal for Cap on Shipping Emissions, BUSINESSGREEN (Sept.
29, 2010), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/analysis/1869813/imo-floats-proposal-cap-shippingemissions.
96. Id.
97. Interview with Peter Oppenheimer, Senior Counsel for Int’l Law, Nat’l Oceanic and
Atmospheric Admin. (Oct. 12, 2010).
98. IMO, Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) 61st Session: 27 September to 1
October 2010 (Oct. 1, 2010),
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MEPC/Pages/MEPC-61st-Session.aspx.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan, INT’L CHAMBER OF SHIPPING,
http://www.shippingandco2.org/SEEMP.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2011).
102. Proposed GHG amendments to MARPOL Convention Circulated for Adoption in 2011, as
IMO Heads to Cancún Climate Change Conference, INT’L MAR. ORG. (Nov. 25, 2010),
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/GHG-amendments-criculated.aspx.
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an agreement.103 Several potential deals were rejected at the meeting,
including a carbon tax across the entire shipping industry and a shipping
emissions cap-and-trade program.104 The lack of agreement is largely
attributable to differences between developed and developing countries
regarding whether mandatory emission reductions should be part of an
agreement.105
Other factors complicating an agreement include the difficulty
associated with measuring shipping emissions and whether to apply the
GHG reduction and efficiency requirements to existing ships.106
Measuring emissions from vessels registered and operating all over the
world involves great practical difficulty.107 Emissions are currently
measured as a function of fuel use when ships refuel at port.108
Additionally, ownership is complex in international shipping. A ship
could be owned by a company in one country, registered in a second
country, and operate between two additional countries.109 These
complexities in the measurement of individual vessel emissions and in
vessel ownership make it difficult to attribute responsibility for shipping
emissions to one particular country.

103. Choppy Waters Ahead for Global Shipping Emissions Deal, BUSINESSGREEN (Oct. 4, 2010),
http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/1870093/choppy-waters-ahead-global-shipping-emissionsdeal.
104. Id.
105. Nichols, supra note 95.
106. Id.
107. See Will Nichols, Have the EU’s Shipping Emissions Proposals Capsized?,
BUSINESSGREEN (Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/1933984/eus-shippingemissions-proposals-capsized. But see Black, supra note 88; Smokestack Lightening, THE
ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 2010, at 76, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17676040; Fiona
Harvey, Cancun – The Shipping News, FIN. TIMES ENERGY SOURCE (Dec. 6, 2010, 11:57 AM),
http://blogs.ft.com/energy-source/2010/12/06/cancun-the-shipping-news. Richard Branson founded
the Carbon War Room project to create an online database grading over 60,000 commercial ships
according to emissions produced. The project aims at producing a data hub to enable businesses and
customers to make more informed business decisions regarding their carbon footprint from
shipping. There is great potential for the website to serve as a tool to green corporations’ supply
chains and to allow government to assign differential landing charges according to ship emission
levels. Black, supra note 88.
108. APOLLONIA MIOLA ET AL., JOINT RESEARCH CTR., REGULATING AIR EMISSIONS FROM
SHIPS: THE STATE OF THE ART ON METHODOLOGIES, TECHNOLOGIES AND POLICY OPTIONS 23–24
(2010), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/jrc_reference_report_2010_11_ships_emissions.pdf;
see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, [2 ENERGY] 2006 IPCC GUIDELINES
FOR
NATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES 3.10 (2006), http://www.ipccnggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/2_Volume2/V2_3_Ch3_Mobile_Combustion.pdf.
109. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE TECHBOOK: MARINE SHIPPING 2
(2010), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/MarineShipping.pdf.
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Another complicating factor is the issue of whether to apply standards
retroactively to already-existing vessels. Even if the IMO were to
establish standards applicable to new ships tomorrow, it would take a
long time for reductions in shipping emissions to be felt throughout the
vessel fleet. Most ships have a lifetime of at least twenty years; unless
emission reduction requirements apply to existing ships, the full
decrease in emissions will not take effect until the fleet turns over.110 But
forcing existing ships to undergo retrofitting to meet increased standards
could be an expensive proposition for ship owners and operators.
Ultimately, the inability of these broader international forums to reach
agreements targeting shipping emissions increases the expectation that
nations will turn to regional plans to achieve reductions.111 The next
IMO meeting was in July 2011, and post-Cancún, the IMO is still the
primary holder of authority to regulate international shipping
emissions.112 However, the EU has pledged to regulate shipping
emissions within its boundaries if substantial steps toward global
agreement are not taken by 2012.113 If there are no steps toward
international agreement by 2012, the EU plans to incorporate shipping
emissions into the EU Emissions Trading Scheme for 2013.114
C.

Global Consensus on Unreasonably Dangerous Products:
Asbestos and Gasoline Lead Additives

While harmonization will not generally result in unanimous adoption
of certain norms, something close to unanimous adoption has been
achieved regarding two unreasonably dangerous products: asbestos and
gasoline lead additives. In the past, when the developed world banned or
severely restricted the use of a product or chemical, companies often
redoubled their efforts to create markets for it in the developing world.
For example, when the EPA was considering phasing out all remaining
uses of asbestos in the early 1980s, the Canadian asbestos industry’s
trade association, the Asbestos Institute, persuaded the World Bank’s

110. Nichols, supra note 95.
111. Choppy Waters Ahead, supra note 103.
112. Shipping Left to Plot GHG Course, for Now, CARBON POSITIVE (Dec. 15, 2010),
http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx?articleID=2218.
113. Id.
114. See Nichols, supra note 107. However, a report by the Joint Research Centre of the
European Commission challenges the enforceability of any such program. The report describes how
any countries that try to exclude noncompliant vessels from docking could face legal action. If the
ships are flying flags of countries outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the EU, excluding
countries would need an extra-territorial basis for jurisdiction. Id.
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fledgling Environment Division to promote greater use of asbestos in
developing countries.115 When the Environmental Defense Fund exposed
what had happened, World Bank President Barber Conable quickly
apologized and vowed that it would not happen again.116
Today nearly all the developed world has formally banned or largely
eliminated the use of asbestos. The International Ban Asbestos
Secretariat lists fifty-five countries that have adopted national asbestos
bans and two others—Singapore and Taiwan—that no longer use the
product.117 While global consumption of asbestos had been declining, in
recent years there has been a sharp increase in the use of this deadly
product in China and India, which have not followed the lead of the
developed world in banning or strictly controlling asbestos.118 China is
now the world’s largest consumer and second-largest producer of
asbestos, using 626,000 metric tons of asbestos fiber in 2007 and mining
280,000 tons of it in 2008.119 India is the next largest consumer of
asbestos, though it uses less than half as much as China.120
The asbestos example illustrates that globalization has not entirely
halted the export of unreasonably dangerous products from developed
countries to the developing world. However, a greater success story for
global health is the phaseout of leaded gasoline. Congress and the EPA
banned the use of lead additives in gasoline, effective in 1986, after
overwhelming evidence revealed that it contributed to widespread lead
poisoning that caused extensive neurological damage in children.121 This
phase-out is widely believed to be one of the greatest public health

115. Michael Huncharek, Exporting Asbestos: Disease and Policy in the Developing World, 14 J.
PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 51, 52 (1993), available at http://www.jstor.org/pss/3342826; see also Rick
Boychuck, Asbestos Exports: Canada Helps a Killer Industry, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, March
1988, at 26; Laurie Kazan-Allen, Canadian Asbestos: A Global Concern, INT’L BAN ASBESTOS
SECRETARIAT (Oct. 23, 2003), http://ibasecretariat.org/lka_ottawa_conf_rep_03.php.
116. As a young attorney for the Environmental Defense Fund, I personally participated in these
events, including the meeting with President Conable.
117. Current Asbestos Bans and Restrictions, INT’L BAN ASBESTOS SECRETARIAT (Jan. 6, 2011),
http://ibasecretariat.org/alpha_ban_list.php. The EPA banned the most ubiquitous uses of asbestos
in the 1970s. Although a judicial decision overturned the EPA’s 1989 ban on all remaining uses of
asbestos, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229–30 (5th Cir. 1991), the court
upheld the agency’s ban on all new uses of asbestos, keeping the industry in a state of perpetual
decline in the United States, id. at 1229.
118. Jim Morris & Te-Ping Chen, A Ravenous Appetite for Asbestos, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY
(July 21, 2010), http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/asbestos/articles/entry/2194.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Small Refiner Lead Phasedown Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 511, 531 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
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triumphs for the EPA in the agency’s more than four decades of
operation. As indicated in the map below, which was prepared by the
United Nations Environment Programme, today nearly all countries have
phased out the use of leaded gasoline.122 Notwithstanding the handful of
countries that still permit its use, leaded gasoline is a powerful example
of how a global norm can arise without the need for a multilateral
environmental agreement seeking to mandate its adoption.
FIGURE III. MAP SHOWING STATUS OF
OUT BY COUNTRY AS OF JANUARY 2011

LEADED GASOLINE PHASE-

III. TRANSNATIONAL LIABILITY LITIGATION
International law has failed to develop an effective system of liability
and compensation for transboundary environmental harm, despite
promises to do so that date as far back as the 1972 United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm.123 Principle 22 of
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration pledged that “[s]tates shall co-operate
to develop further the international law regarding liability and

122. U.N. Environment Programme, Leaded Petrol Phase-out: Global Status January 2011,
http://www.unep.org/transport/PCFV/PDF/MapWorldLead_January2011.pdf (last visited Oct. 19,
2011).
123. This subject is explored in more detail in Percival, supra note 1.
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compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental
damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such
States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.”124 Twenty years later at the
Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the nations of the world adopted the Rio
Declaration, which in nearly identical language directed states to
“cooperate in an expeditious and more determined manner to develop
further international law regarding liability and compensation for
adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities within
their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction.”125
In the absence of an effective international law regime of liability and
compensation for environmental torts involving people and corporate
entities located in more than one country, transnational liability litigation
has surged. These cases generally involve efforts to seek redress for
harm that has not been successfully prevented by regulatory standards.
In many cases the harm has arisen because developing countries do not
have effective regulatory systems to control risky activities. In other
cases, foreign plaintiffs have sought to piggyback on successful U.S.
litigation. This section reviews five different attempts at transnational
liability litigation: (1) tobacco litigation, (2) litigation against Chevron
for oil pollution in Ecuador, (3) litigation against Occidental Petroleum
for oil pollution in Peru, (4) Transnational DBCP Litigation, and (5) the
Trafigura litigation. These lawsuits are part of the emergence of global
law because they help to promote the development of global norms for
acceptable corporate behavior and create pressure to clarify standards for
enforcement of foreign judgments.
A.

Efforts by Foreign Governments to Hold U.S. Tobacco Companies
Liable

The first example of transnational liability litigation involves
environmental health efforts by foreign governments to sue U.S. tobacco
companies. Although efforts by private plaintiffs to recover in tort
against these companies had been largely unsuccessful for decades, in
November 1998 the U.S. tobacco industry settled lawsuits brought
against it by the attorneys general of most states.126 In the Master

124. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swe., June 5–16, 1972,
Report of U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, princ. 22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1
(June 16, 1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
125. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June
3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 13, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
126. Master
Settlement
Agreement
(Nov.
23,
1998)
Exhibit
A,
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Settlement Agreement the companies agreed to pay the states more than
$200 billion over twenty-five years to compensate the states for
increased health care costs engendered by the victims of diseases caused
by smoking.127
In the wake of this settlement, several foreign governments brought
lawsuits against tobacco manufacturers in U.S. courts.128 These suits
took one of two forms: suits to recover the government’s health care
expenses for citizens’ tobacco-related illnesses129 and suits to recover tax
revenues lost due to alleged cigarette smuggling on the black market.130
Many legal analysts believed that the United States was an ideal forum
because of its liberal discovery rules and because the losing party would
not be required to pay the prevailing party’s costs.131 Despite the
perceived advantages of a U.S. courtroom, all of these suits ultimately
were dismissed.132
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Ukraine, and Venezuela all filed suits in U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia to recover the costs of
treating their citizens’ tobacco-related illnesses.133 Each country based
its claim on the theory that since the 1970s tobacco manufacturers had
been engaged in a conspiracy to conceal and misrepresent the health
risks of smoking.134 Guatemala’s suit against Phillip Morris and several
leading tobacco manufacturers was a landmark test case.135 The court,

http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/MSA%20with%20Sig%20Pages%20an
d%20Exhibits.pdf (providing a list of participating States and their allocated percentages of the
settlement agreement). Tobacco use is properly considered an environmental risk in light of the
risks posed by exposure to second-hand smoke.
127. See id.
128. CTR. FOR COMMC’NS, HEALTH, & ENV’T, TOBACCO FACT SHEET, LITIGATION AGAINST THE
TOBACCO INDUSTRY 2 (2000),
http://www.ceche.org/publications/factshts/factsheets_files/toblitigation.pdf.
129. The Governments of Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Ukraine raised this claim. VANESSA
BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33719, TOBACCO: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 2 (2007),
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL33719.pdf.
130. Countries raising this claim included Canada, the European Community, Honduras,
Ecuador, Belize, and political subdivisions of the Republic of Columbia. Brenda Mallinak, The
Revenue Rule: A Common Law Doctrine for the Twenty First Century, 16 DUKE J. OF COMP. &
INT’L. L. 79, 102 (2006).
131. CTR. FOR COMMC’NS, HEALTH & ENV’T, supra note 128.
132. BURROWS, supra note 129.
133. Sean D. Murphy ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law: Guatemalan Suit Against U.S. Tobacco Companies, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 516, 543 (2000).
134. Id.
135. In re Tobacco/Gov’t Health Care Costs Litig., 83 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D.D.C. 1999). In addition
to common law tort claims, the Guatemalan government claimed violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and violations of federal and District of
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applying the test for remoteness from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Holmes v. Securities Investors Protection Corp.,136 dismissed the case
for remoteness.137 The doctrine of remoteness provides that a plaintiff
cannot recover for harm flowing merely from the misfortunes of a third
person caused by the defendant’s action.138 The court also found
Guatemala’s claims to be completely derivative of the choices made and
the injuries suffered by individual citizens.139 Thus, the several steps that
the court would have to take to trace the defendant’s action to the
Guatemalan government’s injury rendered the injury too remote and
attenuated.140 The court also found that Guatemala could not sue in a
parens patriae action because the government could not articulate a
sufficiently concrete quasi-sovereign interest apart from the particular
interests of private parties.141
Suits brought by other foreign governments raised the same claims
and were ultimately dismissed for remoteness. Nicaragua and Ukraine
also saw their cases dismissed.142 Bolivia’s143 and Venezuela’s144 claims,
filed in state court, were consolidated in multidistrict litigation.145
Venezuela’s claim ultimately was dismissed because the court held that
the government’s injuries were too remote, indirect, and derivative.146
Panama’s and Brazil’s claims, both filed in Delaware state court,147 also

Columbia antitrust laws. Id. at 127.
136. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
137. In re Tobacco, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 126, 128.
138. Id. at 128.
139. Id. at 129.
140. Id. at 130. The court also found that it would have to develop complicated rules to apportion
damages among different levels of injury. Id.
141. Id. at 133. The court found that Guatemala’s interest in recovering for injuries to its treasury,
incurred by paying millions to treat tobacco-related illnesses, was a proprietary, not quasi-sovereign,
interest. Id. at 134.
142. Murphy, supra note 133, at 543; Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip
Morris Inc., 249 F.3d 1068, 1071 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
143. Republic of Bol. v. Philip Morris Cos., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
144. Republic of Venez. ex rel. Garrido v. Philip Morris Cos., 827 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
145. In re Tobacco/Gov’t Health Care Costs Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 5, 6 (D.D.C. 1999).
146. Republic of Venez., 827 So. 2d at 341.
147. Panama brought claims under Panamanian civil law and Brazil brought claims under
Brazilian civil law. Both countries brought claims under Delaware law. Republic of Pan. v. Am.
Tobacco Co., No. 05C–07–181–RRC, 2006 WL 1933740, at *1 (Del. Super. 2006), aff’d sub nom.
State of São Paulo of Federative Republic of Braz. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 919 A.2d 1116 (Del. 2007).
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were dismissed for remoteness and failure to meet the requirements for
parens patriae standing.148
In addition, Canada, the European Community, Honduras, Ecuador,
Belize, and political subdivisions of the Republic of Columbia filed suit
against U.S. tobacco manufacturers under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to recover costs incurred as a result
of an alleged conspiracy to smuggle cigarettes on the black market.149
Canada’s150 and Ecuador’s151 claims were both dismissed when the court
determined that the revenue rule barred the claims. The revenue rule
provides that “courts of one sovereign will not enforce final tax
judgments or unadjudicated tax claims of other sovereigns.”152 The
failure of these suits demonstrates that U.S. courts are generally hostile
to tort litigation brought by foreign plaintiffs. However, even when
transnational litigation fails in court, it serves a vital purpose, because it
draws attention to environmentally destructive practices that companies
should abandon.
B.

Litigation Against Chevron for Oil Pollution in Ecuador

The hostility of U.S. courts towards tort litigation by foreign plaintiffs
has also extended to lawsuits seeking recovery for environmental harm
caused by U.S. corporations in other countries. The most significant
example of such litigation is the decades-old battle between residents of
Ecuador’s Amazon region and the U.S. oil company that Ecuador’s
government had invited to develop oil resources in the country during
the 1970s. This litigation may help reshape transnational norms
concerning corporate behavior and standards of due process necessary
for the enforcement of foreign judgments.
While a refusal by U.S. courts to grant relief often signaled the end of
litigation by foreign plaintiffs, long-running litigation against Chevron
for oil pollution in Ecuador may change this perception. For nearly two
decades, residents of the Oriente region of Ecuador have been suing
Texaco (and its successor corporation, Chevron). These residents are

148. Id. at *7–9. The governments also failed to establish the substantive applicable law of
Panama and Brazil. Id. at *4.
149. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 251, 265
(2006).
150. Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001).
151. Republic of Ecuador v. Philip Morris Cos., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff’d sub
nom. Republic of Hond. v. Philip Morris Cos., 341 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2003).
152. Att’y Gen. of Can., 268 F.3d at 109.
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seeking compensation for, and remediation of, severe pollution from oil
drilling operations that occurred during the 1970s.153 Legal proceedings
have ranged from the United States to Ecuador to the Permanent Court
of Arbitration in The Hague. Most recently, these proceedings also
returned to the United States; immediately before an Ecuadoran court
issued an $18 billion judgment against it, Chevron filed a racketeering
lawsuit against the Ecuadoran plaintiffs and their attorneys in a U.S.
court.
1.

Litigation Overview

The litigation began in 1993 when Ecuadoran plaintiffs filed suit
against Texaco in U.S. federal court under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS).154 Texaco initially persuaded a federal trial court in New York to
dismiss the litigation on the ground of forum non conveniens. But in
Jota v. Texaco, Inc.,155 the Second Circuit reversed this dismissal. The
Second Circuit held that the district court should not have used the
doctrine of forum non conveniens to dismiss the case without at least
requiring the company to submit to Ecuador’s jurisdiction.156 In
subsequent litigation the court affirmed the dismissal of the suit only on
the condition that Texaco submit to the jurisdiction of the Ecuadoran
courts.157 This dismissal was widely viewed as Texaco’s escape from
liability.
The May 2003 refiling of the case in Ecuador by forty-eight residents
of the afflicted Oriente region challenged this perception.158 Chevron
advanced three arguments in its defense: (1) everything it did in Ecuador
was legal; (2) it spent $40 million on environmental cleanup; and (3) the

153. See generally Judith Kimerling, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The
Case of Ecuador, ChevronTexaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 413 (2006)
(discussing Texaco’s exploitation of crude oil in Ecuador).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The ATS, which was adopted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear a civil action by “an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350.
155. Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 163 (2d Cir. 1998).
156. Id. at 153.
157. Aguinda v. Texaco Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 478 (2d Cir. 2002).
158. Complaint, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 002-2003 (Super. Ct. of Justice of
“Nueva Loja” in Lago Agrio, May 7, 2003),
http://www.contractormisconduct.org/ass/contractors/140/cases/750/866/chevrontexaco-aguinda_co
mplaint.pdf (translated complaint); Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco: Discretionary
Grounds for the Non-recognition of Foreign Judgments for Environmental Injury in the United
States, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 242 (2010).
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Ecuadoran government released it from further liability to the
government in 1992 when Texaco left the country.159 The plaintiffs
claim that this settlement with an overly compliant government does not
absolve Texaco of responsibility for the harm their activities caused to
the individual plaintiffs in the lawsuit.160
On May 21, 2010, Chevron filed a request for dismissal of a courtappointed expert and rejection of the expert’s assessment that oil
pollution in the Oriente region had caused $27 billion in damages.161
Chevron claimed that the appointee, Richard Cabrera, worked directly
with the plaintiffs and their consultants through ongoing contacts and
provision of materials from the plaintiffs.162 Plaintiffs argued that
Cabrera sought materials from both parties, but Chevron did not
participate.163 Chevron already argued that Cabrera was not independent
in 2008 when Cabrera estimated damages at $27 billion.164 Chevron
claimed that Cabrera’s estimates exceeded the scope of his mandate and
contained inconsistencies.165
The evidentiary phase of the case in Ecuador ended in December
2010,166 and final arguments were submitted to the court at the end of
January 2011.167 On February 14, 2011, the court in Lago Agria,
Ecuador, released a 188-page decision awarding approximately $8.6
billion in damages for the remediation of contaminated soils.168 While
far less than the $27 billion estimated by the court-appointed expert, the
judgment also included $8.6 billion in punitive damages and an award of
$860 million to the plaintiffs, bringing the total judgment to $18
billion.169 Chevron is now scrambling to prevent any future enforcement

159. Percival, supra note 1, at 58.
160. Id.
161. Chevron Asks Ecuador Court to Dismiss Key Expert, REUTERS (May 24, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64N59320100524.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Dhooge, supra note 158, at 260.
166. Hugh Bronstein, Film Outtakes Steal Stage in Chevron Ecuador Case, REUTERS (Jan. 11,
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1024757420110111.
167. Braden Reddall & Dan Levine, Chevron Accuses Ecuadorean Plaintiffs of Extortion,
REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE7110TH20110202.
168. Ben Casselman et al., Chevron Hit with Record Judgment, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2011, at A1
[hereinafter Record Judgment I]; see also Ben Casselman, Chevron Hit with Record Judgment,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Feb.
15,
2011)
[hereinafter
Record
Judgment
II],
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB10001424052748703584804576144464044068664,00.html.
169. SIMON BILLENNESS & SANFORD LEWIS, AN ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL AND
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of the judgment.170
Since 2009, Chevron has vowed that it will not pay an enormous
judgment and that it will fight in the courts of both Ecuador and the
United States for decades if necessary. While some shareholders have
urged the company to settle, Chevron spokesperson Don Campbell told
the Wall Street Journal, “We’re not going to be bullied into a
settlement” because the company has done nothing wrong.171
2.

Chevron’s RICO Lawsuit and the Battle over “Crude” Outtakes

On February 2, 2011, Chevron filed suit against the Ecuadoran
plaintiffs, their lawyers, and supporters from both the United States and
Ecuador.172 Chevron filed the lawsuit under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act,173 alleging that the defendants’
“ultimate aim is to create enough pressure on Chevron in the United
States to extort it into paying to stop the campaign against it.”174
Chevron seeks a judicial declaration finding any judgment by the
Ecuadoran court to be fraudulent and unenforceable.175 Additionally,
Chevron is asking for damages consistent with costs from defending the
Ecuadoran lawsuit.176 Chevron bases its claim on alleged collusion
between the plaintiffs and Richard Cabrera, the expert who estimated
damages and remediation costs at $27 billion.177 Chevron’s evidence
centers on footage from the 2009 documentary Crude and plaintiffs’
documents release by the Ecuadoran plaintiffs’ former lawyer, Steven
Donziger.178

OPERATIONAL RISKS TO CHEVRON CORPORATION FROM AGUINDA V. CHEVRONTEXACO 5 (2011),
http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/Chevron-Ecuador_Risk_Analysis_Report_May2011.pdf.
170. Record Judgment I, supra note 168, at A1; Record Judgment II, supra note 168.
171. Ben Casselman, Chevron Expects to Fight Ecuador Lawsuit in U.S.—As Largest
Environmental Judgment on Record Looms, the Oil Company Reassures Shareholders it Won’t Pay,
WALL ST. J., July 20, 2009, at B3.
172. Reddall & Levine, supra note 167.
173. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006).
174. Amended Complaint at 1, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 1:11-cv-00691-LAK, 2011 WL
1805313 (S.D.N.Y. April, 20, 2011).
175. Press Release, Chevron Corp., Chevron Files Fraud and RICO Case Against Lawyers and
Consultants Behind Ecuador Litigation (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/02012011_chevronfilesfraudandricocaseagai
nstlawyersandconsultantsbehindecuadorlitigation.news.
176. Id.
177. Reddall & Levine, supra note 167.
178. Id. Documentary footage was obtained by Chevron through litigation in U.S. courts.
Specifically, the district court and the Second Circuit addressed discovery requests from litigation in
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Chevron obtained the documents referenced in Chevron’s RICO
lawsuit through a series of legal proceedings filed in the United States.179
Chevron is using these documents to bolster its accusations of fraud;
according to a Chevron spokesperson, “We’ve been able to uncover
evidence of fraud, of attorney misconduct. It shows just how illegitimate
the process in Ecuador has become.”180 As noted by at least one of the
U.S. judges adjudicating Chevron’s recent accusations, these statements
make a striking contrast to the arguments used by Chevron in its forum
non conveniens arguments.181
Chevron has been compelling discovery through a series of federal
court filings throughout the United States. Defendants in these filings
include the Ecuadoran plaintiffs’ lawyers and experts used in the
Ecuadoran litigation.182 Discovery was intended to support both the
Ecuadoran litigation and Chevron’s international arbitration claim.183
Chevron’s complaints include assertions that privileged information
should also be released because of the crime-fraud exception. Courts
have both accepted and rejected this assertion.184 A judge in the Western

Ecuador relating to indictment of two lawyers representing Chevron. In re Application of Chevron
Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 291–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger,
629 F.3d 297, 306–11 (2d Cir. 2011); Mark Hamblett, Chevron Presses Panel to Allow Review of
Film’s Raw Footage, 243 N.Y.L.J. 1 (2010). As part of the defense for the two Chevron lawyers in
Ecuador, Chevron sought subpoenas for outtake footage from a New York documentary filmmaker,
who was hired by plaintiffs’ counsel to film the litigation process from the plaintiffs’ perspectives.
Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d at 285. The Second Circuit granted Chevron’s request. 629 F.3d at
310–11.
179. David R. Baker, Chevron Tries to Turn Foes’ Words Against Them, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 29,
2010, at D1.
180. Id. at D5.
181. See Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d at 298–99 (noting that Chevron “extolled the virtues of
the Ecuadorian legal system while the plaintiffs questioned its abilities and rectitude” during
Chevron’s earlier request for dismissal, and suggesting that the change to a more plaintiff-friendly
national government may have something to do with this role reversal).
182. See, e.g., In re Chevron Corp., 753 F. Supp. 2d 536, 538, 541 (D.M.D. 2010) (granting
discovery request to compel documents from experts who suggested $113 billion in damages was a
more appropriate amount than the previous amount of $27 billion).
183. In re Application of Chevron Corp., 762 F. Supp. 2d 242, 248 (D. Mass. 2010).
184. Compare Chevron Corp. v. Camp, Nos. 1:10mc27, 1:10mc28, 2010 WL 3418394, at *6,
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 28, 2010) (finding that privileged information could be compelled for discovery),
with Chevron Corp., 762 F. Supp. 2d at 254, (finding that Chevron had not met the “heavy burden
in establishing that narrow exception”), and Chevron Corp. v. Stratus Consulting, Inc., No. 10-cv00047-MSK-MEH, 2010 WL 3923092, at *11, (D. Colo. Oct. 1, 2010) (declining to decide the
crime-fraud allegation and leaving it “to the discretion and jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian court”),
and In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d 27, 46 (D.D.C. 2010) (declining to decide on the crime-fraud
exception), appeal dismissed, No. 10-7145, 2010 WL 5140467 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 17, 2010), and
appeal dismissed, No. 10-7144, 2011 WL 1765213 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 18, 2011).
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District of North Carolina compelled discovery of privileged information
and made the following statement:
While this court is unfamiliar with the practices of the
Ecuadorian judicial system, the court must believe that the
concept of fraud is universal, and that what has blatantly
occurred in this matter would in fact be considered fraud by any
court. If such conduct does not amount to fraud in a particular
country, then that country has larger problems than an oil
spill.185
3.

Arbitration Suits Filed by Chevron at the Permanent Court of
Arbitration

As part of its defense strategy, Chevron has sought to multiply the
venues in which the plaintiffs must fight by seeking the assistance of
other tribunals. In September 2009, Chevron filed an international
arbitration claim against the government of Ecuador in the Permanent
Court of Arbitration in The Hague.186 Chevron based its claim on what it
calls the Ecuadoran government’s “exploitation” of the lawsuit.187
Specifically, Chevron claims that the government of Ecuador violated its
obligations under the U.S.–Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty, other
investment agreements, and international law.188 Chevron alleges that
the Ecuadoran government did this by colluding with the plaintiffs and
their counsel, violating contracts with Texaco Petroleum,189 and
instigating an “inappropriate[] criminal[]” indictment and sanction of
two Chevron lawyers.190 Chevron is asking the tribunal to enforce its
1998 cleanup agreement with the government of Ecuador and the U.S.–
Ecuador investment treaty.191
While Chevron’s move was widely expected, many observers thought

185. Camp, 2010 WL 3418394, at *6.
186. Press Release, Chevron Corp., Chevron Files International Arbitration Against the
Government of Ecuador Over Violations of the United States–Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty
(Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://www.chevron.com/news/press/release/?id=2009-09-23; Angel
Gonzalez & Ben Casselman, Chevron Plaintiffs Ask U.S. Court for Action, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15,
2010, at B3, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704363504575003153443151606.html.
187. Press Release, Chevron Corp., supra note 186.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Ecuador v. Chevron, No. 09 Civ. 9958(LBS), 2010 WL 1028349, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. March 16,
2010).
191. Press Release, Chevron Corp., supra note 186.
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it would not occur until after litigation against the company concluded in
Ecuadoran courts. Chevron claimed that it had no choice because
“Ecuador’s judicial system is incapable of functioning independently of
political influence.”192 Ecuadoran Attorney General Diego Garcia
rejected Chevron’s effort to impugn the integrity of the Ecuadoran
judiciary.193 Garcia noted that the plaintiffs in the lawsuit before the
Ecuadoran court are not parties to the arbitration proceeding Chevron
has initiated in The Hague.194 Ecuador brought suit in the Southern
District of New York to enjoin the arbitration. However, the Southern
District recognized the “arbitrability” of Chevron’s claim and denied the
Republic of Ecuador’s request for an injunction and summary judgment
against Chevron’s arbitration claim.195 The Second Circuit affirmed an
appeal of this judgment in 2011.196
4.

Judicial Recusal and Judgment in the Ecuador Trial Court

When the Ecuadoran trial court finally reached its judgment in
February 2011, the judge issuing the decision was the third judge to hear
the case in Ecuador. In September 2009, Judge Juan Núñez recused
himself from the case after Chevron released video that the company
claimed showed the judge was committed to ruling against the oil
company.197 In the video, which was posted on Chevron’s website, the
judge reportedly refuses to reveal the verdict several times, but then
responds “Yes, sir” to an inquiry as to whether Chevron “is the guilty
party.”198 The video also reportedly contains a discussion of how
Chevron’s remediation funds will be spent and a suggestion that some
could be used to pay off government officials. The video was covertly
filmed by an Ecuadoran former contractor for Chevron who the oil
company claims was acting entirely independently. While Judge Núñez
claimed the video had been doctored and denied that he had prejudged

192. Id.
193. See Santiago Cueto, Chevron Files for International Arbitration Claim Against Ecuador:
Forum Shopping at the Hague?, CHEVRON IN ECUADOR (Sept. 28. 2009),
http://www.chevroninecuador.com/2009/09/chevron-files-international-arbitration.html.
194. See id.
195. Ecuador, 2010 WL 1028349, at *2.
196. Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 388 (2d Cir. 2011).
197. David R. Baker, Judge in Case Against Chevron Recuses Himself in Wake of Tapes, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 5, 2009, at D1; see also David R. Baker, Judge Recuses Himself in Suit Against
Chevron, SFGATE.COM (Sept. 5, 2009), http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-0905/business/17205188_1_tapes-videos-case.
198. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the case,199 Washington Pezántes, the attorney general of Ecuador, asked
the judge to recuse himself.200 In October 2010, the Judicial Council
disbarred Judge Núñez for his conduct in the case.201 Judge Núñez’s
successor, Judge Leonardo Ordonez, was replaced in October 2010 at
the request of Chevron.202 Chevron based this request on Judge
Ordonez’s alleged failure to investigate evidence of collusion between
the plaintiffs and Cabrera, the expert who estimated up to $27 billion in
damages.203
Judge Nicolás Zambrano, the third judge, presided over the final
phases of this case and rendered the $18 billion verdict on February 14,
2011. The judgment includes $5.39 billion to restore polluted soil, $1.4
billion to create a health system for the community, $800 million to treat
people affected by the pollution, $600 million to restore polluted water
sources, $200 million to help native species recover, $150 million to
supply water to the community from unpolluted sources, and $100
million to create a community cultural reconstruction program.204 It also
includes $8.6 billion in punitive damages and an award of $860 million
to the plaintiffs.205 A Chevron spokesman denounced the judgment as
“illegitimate,” “unenforceable,” “the product of fraud,” and “contrary to
the legitimate scientific evidence.”206

199. Mercedes Alvaro & Angel Gonzalez, Judge in Chevron Dispute Says Video Doctored,
WALL STREET J., Sept. 2, 2009, at B6, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125186165368578445.html.
200. Mercedes Alvaro, Judge in Chevron Case Agrees to Step Aside, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2009,
at B5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125208172990086901.html.
201. Alexandra Valencia, Ecuador Disbars Judge Who Heard Chevron Case, REUTERS (Oct. 28,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2815738920101029.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Isabel Ordonez, A Breakdown of the $8.6 Billion Chevron Judgment, WALL STREET J. LAW
BLOG (Feb. 14, 2011, 4:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/02/14/a-breakdown-of-the-8billion-chevron-judgment.
205. See BILLENNESS & LEWIS, supra note 169.
206. Press Release, Chevron Corp., Illegitimate Judgment Against Chevron in Ecuador Lawsuit,
Chevron to appeal in Ecuador, enforcement blocked by U.S. and international tribunals (Feb. 14,
2011),
http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/02142011_illegitimatejudgmentagainstchevr
oninecuadorlawsuit.news; see also Record Judgment I, supra note 168; Record Judgment II, supra
note 168.
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Chevron’s Efforts to Block Enforcement of the Ecuadoran
Judgment

Six days before the Ecuadoran court issued its judgment, Chevron
won a temporary restraining order from a federal district court in New
York prospectively blocking enforcement in any court in the world of
any judgment related to the case.207 The order is premised on Chevron’s
allegations that the plaintiffs and their lawyers are engaged in a
racketeering conspiracy to shake down the company.208 At a hearing in
New York on February 8, 2011, Chevron alleged that lawyers and
plaintiffs’ experts had doctored evidence.209
Ironically, Texaco could have had the lawsuit decided by courts in the
United States during the early 1990s, but it was the company that
insisted that Ecuador was a more convenient forum.210 The federal court
in New York dismissed the case on the condition that the company
accept the jurisdiction of the Ecuadoran courts.211 After a change of
government, Ecuador did not become the friendly forum Chevron had
anticipated.212
The editors of the Wall Street Journal denounced the litigation against
Chevron in an editorial entitled “Shakedown in Ecuador.”213 The
editorial declared that the “Ecuador suit is a form of global forum
shopping, with U.S. trial lawyers and NGOs trying to hold American
companies hostage in the world’s least accountable and transparent legal
systems.”214 The Journal editors have thrice before denounced the
lawsuit,215 but what proves their “forum shopping” claim to be

207. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
208. See id. at 627, 634; Amended Complaint at 1, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 1:11-cv-00691LAK, (S.D.N.Y. April 20, 2011), 2011 WL 1805313; Editorial, Shakedown in Ecuador, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 16, 2011, at A16, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703652104576121941625806096.html.
209. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Chevron Wins TRO Barring Ecuadorian Plaintiffs and Their
Lawyers From Attempting to Enforce Ecuadorian Judgment, AM. LAW. (Feb. 10, 2011),
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202481024550.
210. Kimerling, supra note 153, at 484.
211. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d as modified, 303
F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 478 (2d Cir. 2002).
212. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also In re application of Chevron,
709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 288–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d
297 (2d Cir. 2011).
213. Shakedown in Ecuador, supra note 208, at A16.
214. Id.
215. Shakedown in the Rain Forest: The attempt to loot Chevron for $27 billion is falling apart,
WALL ST. J., Sep. 23, 2010, at A22, available at
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astonishingly false is the fact that the plaintiffs wanted the lawsuit
litigated in New York federal court in 1993, but the case was dismissed
in favor of the Ecuador forum at Chevron’s behest in 2002.216
The judgment of the court in Ecuador may spur legal battles in even
more countries as the parties fight over its enforceability wherever
Chevron has assets. Chevron’s strategy of expanding the litigation to
other courts and to the Permanent Court of Arbitration may have been an
effort in part to exhaust the plaintiff’s resources. But, because of the
amount of money at stake—prior to the issuance of the judgment in
Ecuador, Morgan Stanley predicted that Chevron ultimately would have
to settle the case for between $2 and 3 billion217—hedge funds stepped
in and provided extra money to the plaintiffs who have now been able to
hire a major Washington law firm to assist with the growing litigation.218
On March 7, 2011, Chevron obtained a preliminary injunction from
the federal district judge in New York hearing Chevron’s RICO
litigation that barred the plaintiffs and their lawyers from seeking to
enforce the $18 billion judgment. Judge Lewis A. Kaplan ruled that
there was “ample evidence of fraud in the Ecuadorian proceedings”219
and “abundant evidence . . . that Ecuador has not provided impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law.”220 He cited
a report from a legal expert commissioned by Chevron that stated the
judiciary in Ecuador is subject to political pressure from the government

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703625304575115831733424838.html;
Bret
Stephens, Amazonian Swindle, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2007, at A18; see Ben Casselman, Chevron
Accuses Ecuador Plaintiffs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2011, at B3; see also Ben Casselman, Chevron
Seeks to Turn Tables in Ecuador Case, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2011, 7:04 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704358704576118694226628616.html.
This
coverage has not escaped Chevron’s notice. Ecuador Lawsuit - News Coverage, CHEVRON,
http://www.chevron.com/ecuador/newscoverage/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2011) (compiling Chevronfriendly articles).
216. Robert V. Percival, Letter to the Editor, Texaco Asked for Ecuadorian Venue, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 22, 2011, at A14, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704900004576152370171056008.html.
217. Hugh Bronstein, Chevron Case Keeps Ecuador Judge Up Late, REUTERS, Feb 1, 2011,
http://in.reuters.com/article/idINN3124172720110131 (estimating that this figure is “about half of
the company’s most recent quarterly profit”).
218. Rosario Gabino, ¿Como Pagan Los Ecuatorianos el Juicio Contra Chevron?, BBC MUNDO
(Feb. 18, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/noticias/2011/02/110218_ecuador_chevron_financiamiento_rg.shtml;
see also Scott Tong, A Long, Long Legal Bet, MARKETPLACE (Feb. 15, 2011),
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/02/15/pm-a-long-long-legal-bet; Record
Judgment I, supra note 168, at A1; Record Judgment II, supra note 168.
219. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
220. Id. at 633.
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and that Ecuador ranks among the lowest nations in assessments of the
strength of the rule of law.221 Luis Gallegos, Ecuador’s ambassador to
the United States, defended the country’s judicial system and expressed
“consternation that a U.S. court has elected to pass judgment on
Ecuador’s courts.”222 On September 19, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit vacated Judge Kaplan’s injunction while refusing
the plaintiffs’ request to remove him from the case.223
Regardless of which side ultimately prevails on appeal, the litigation
will have a profound effect on transnational environmental litigation.
First, it may make multinational companies more reluctant to seek
dismissal of litigation on forum non conveniens grounds if the result is
submitting to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. It also may generate
pressure for countries to refine their standards for enforcing foreign
judgments.224 Finally, because Chevron no longer has assets in Ecuador,
the battle over enforcement of the Ecuadoran judgment against it will
221. Id. at 634–35.
222. Lawrence Hurley, Ecuador’s U.S. Ambassador Speaks Out on Chevron Case, N.Y. TIMES
GREEN (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/03/10/10greenwire-ecuadors-usambassador-speaks-out-on-chevron-c-86771.html.
223. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, Nos. 11-1150-cv(L), 11-1264-cv(con), 11-2259-op(con), 2011
WL 4375022, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2011).
224. The United States is not a party to any international treaties on the reciprocal recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. These matters are largely governed by state law, including the
UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 Pt. II U.L.A. 39 (2002), which has
been adopted by more than thirty U.S. states and territories, and general principles of comity. Mark
Moedritzer, Kay C. Whittaker & Ariel Ye, Judgments ‘Made in China’ But Enforceable in the
United States?: Obtaining Recognition and Enforcement in the United States of Monetary
Judgments Entered in China Against U.S. Companies Doing Business Abroad, 44 INT’L LAW. 817,
819 (2010). For a final foreign judgment to be enforced in the United States, the foreign court must
have been an impartial tribunal using principles that afford due process of law with personal
jurisdiction over the defendant and subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. Id. at 822.
One federal law that specifically addresses enforcement of foreign judgments was signed into law
by President Obama in August 2010—the Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established
Constitutional Heritage Act (SPEECH Act), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 4101–4105 (West Supp. 2011). The
SPEECH Act, which was inspired by New York’s 2008 Libel Terrorism Protection Act, makes libel
judgments against U.S. writers obtained in foreign countries unenforceable in U.S. courts if they
involve speech protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Andrew Albanese,
Obama Signs ‘Libel Tourism’ Law, PUBLISHERS WKLY. (Aug. 12, 2010),
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/publisher-news/article/44148-obamasigns-libel-tourism-law.html. The SPEECH Act is designed to deter “libel tourists” from seeking to
use British courts where there are far more limited free speech protections to obtain judgments
against U.S. writers for acts that would not be deemed libelous under U.S. law. The law is expected
to increase pressure on Britain to revise its libel laws. Alex Spillious, US Outlaws ‘Libel Tourists’
Who Turn to Britain, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 29, 2010, at 16; Alex Spillious, US Law to
Counter ‘Libel Tourism’ in British Courts, THE TELEGRAPH (July 28, 2010, 8:00 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7915063/US-law-to-counter-libeltourism-in-British-courts.html.
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continue in foreign courts, principally in the United States; as these
courts continue to wrestle with the question of whether Ecuador’s
judicial system is entitled to respect, they may help shape global norms
of due process. This in turn may influence the development of global
law and how courts in other countries conduct themselves in their future
proceedings.
C.

Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corporation

The Chevron litigation is not the only ongoing case involving harm
allegedly caused in a foreign country by a U.S. oil company. In 2007,
Amazon Watch,225 a U.S. environmental group, and twenty-five
members of the Achuar indigenous group from the Rio Corrientes River
region in Peru filed suit against Occidental Petroleum and its subsidiary,
Occidental Peruana (OxyPeru) in Los Angeles Superior Court.226 From
the early 1970s to 2000, OxyPeru operated an extensive oil extraction,
processing, and distribution site known as “Block 1-AB” in an area that
encompassed lands both within and upstream from Achuar
communities.227 Occidental allegedly used methods of crude oil
processing that it knew violated both U.S. and Peruvian law, releasing
oil and its byproducts into area waterways.228 The plaintiffs alleged that
these activities polluted the waters of the Rio Corrientes, causing harm
to soil, fish, plants, and animals, and illness in the Achuar
communities.229 Members of the Achuar community suffered from high
blood levels of lead and cadmium, gastrointestinal problems, kidney
trouble, skin rashes, and aches and pains.230
Rather than bringing claims under the Alien Tort Statute, the
plaintiffs raised common law tort claims including negligence, medical
monitoring, and trespass.231 Occidental removed the suit to federal

225. Amazon Watch took part in the suit after traveling to the region and producing a
documentary film about the pollution in the region. Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 643
F.3d 1216, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). The case was initially decided in December 2010, Carijano v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 626 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2010), but the Ninth Circuit later withdrew
this opinion and issued a new opinion in June of 2011.
226. Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 548 F. Supp. 2d 823, 823 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
227. Id. at 826.
228. Carijano, 643 F.3d at 1222.
229. Carijano, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 826.
230. Carijano, 643 F.3d at 1223.
231. Carijano, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 826. The plaintiffs also alleged strict liability, battery,
injunctive relief or damages in lieu of injunction, wrongful death, fraud, trespass, public nuisance,
private nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of California’s Unfair
Competition Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008).

WLR_October_Percival_FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

2011]

GLOBAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT

10/21/2011 1:19 PM

617

district court and successfully moved for dismissal on the basis of forum
non conveniens, arguing that Peru is a more convenient forum.232 Under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the district court found that
Occidental met its burden of proving that Peru was a suitable forum233
and that the private interest factors234 and public interest factors235 were
satisfied. Though there is a strong presumption in favor of a domestic
plaintiff’s choice of forum under the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
the district court granted Occidental’s motion to dismiss.236 The district
court reasoned that although Amazon Watch is a California plaintiff, the
fact that the Achuar are foreign plaintiffs lessened the deference given to
their choice of forum.237
Plaintiffs appealed, and on December 6, 2010, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held: (1)
Occidental did not meet its burden of proving that Peru is a more
convenient forum; (2) the court gave insufficient weight to the
presumption in favor of the domestic plaintiff’s choice of forum; and (3)
the court abused its discretion in dismissing the lawsuit.238 The court
found abuse of discretion because the trial court failed to place any
mitigating conditions on its dismissal when it was justifiable to believe
that Occidental would seek to dismiss the case under Peru’s statute of
limitations.239

232. Carijano, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
233. Id. The court found that OxyPeru is subject to jurisdiction in Peruvian courts and adequate
tort relief is available in this system. Id. at 828–29. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that
the Peruvian court system was “too corrupt” to provide adequate tort relief. Id. at 831.
234. The private interest factors are:
(1) the residence of the parties and witnesses; (2) the forum’s convenience to the litigants; (3)
access to physical evidence and other sources of proof; (4) whether unwilling witnesses can be
compelled to testify; (5) the cost of bringing witnesses to trial; (6) the enforceability of the
judgment; and (7) “all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and
inexpensive.”
Id. at 832 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).
235. Id. at 833. These factors include “court congestion, local interest in resolving the
controversy, and preference for having a forum apply a law with which it is familiar.” Id.
236. Id. at 835.
237. Id. at 834.
238. Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 626 F.3d 1137, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010). On June 1,
2011, the court withdrew its initial opinion and filed an amended opinion. Carijano v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 643 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The new opinion reaches the same result, reversing
the district court.
239. Carijano, 643 F.3d at 1234. Plaintiffs had requested that the court apply the following
conditions: “(1) any Peruvian judgment be satisfied; (2) Occidental waive any statute of limitations
defense in Peru that would not be available in California; (3) Occidental agree to comply with
United States discovery rules; and (4) Occidental translate documents from English to Spanish.” Id.
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This case suggests that U.S. courts assessing claims of forum non
conveniens are paying more attention to the consequences of such
dismissals by considering the state of law in other countries. While no
U.S. court has rendered a judgment holding a U.S. corporation liable for
environmental harm caused abroad, lawsuits seeking relief for such harm
have contributed to an ongoing global debate over what constitutes
appropriate corporate behavior when companies from developed
countries engage in resource extraction in the developing world.240 How
these cases are resolved in the future will help shape developing norms
of global environmental law.
D.

Transnational DBCP Litigation

Litigation brought by foreigners over exposure to a pesticide banned
in the United States illustrates both the power and shortcomings of
transnational tort litigation. In Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro,241
banana workers in Costa Rica, who allegedly had become sterile,
claimed that they had been injured by a pesticide (1,2-Dibromo-3Chloropropane, or DBCP) that the EPA had banned for use within the
United States because of its reproductive toxicity.242 The workers
brought a tort action in Texas state court against Dow Chemical, the
U.S. company that continued to produce the pesticide solely for the
export market, as permitted by U.S. law.243 After the trial court
dismissed the action on forum non conveniens grounds, the plaintiffs
appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.244 By a vote of five to four, the
court held that the case must be heard in Texas because Texas law did
not recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens.245 Shortly before
the case was scheduled to go to trial in 1992, the eighty-two plaintiffs
and their wives received a settlement worth nearly $20 million.246
240. See generally, e.g., LUKE DANIELSON, GLOBAL PUB. POLICY INST., ARCHITECTURE FOR
CHANGE: AN ACCOUNT OF THE MINING, MINERALS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(2006), http://www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Architecture-for-ChangeMMSD_Full_Report1.pdf (suggesting the development of environmental norms for extractive
industries operating in developing countries).
241. 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990).
242. The pesticide DBCP to which the plaintiffs were exposed had been banned in the United
States since 1977. The history behind this ban is told in DEVRA DAVIS, WHEN SMOKE RAN LIKE
WATER 195–200 (2002).
243. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006).
244. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 675.
245. Id. at 679.
246. Rick Kennedy, Fruit of the Poison Tree; In a Dallas Court, Costa Rican Banana Workers
Claim a Banana Pesticide Left Them Sterile, DALLAS OBSERVER (Mar. 10, 2005), available at

WLR_October_Percival_FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

2011]

GLOBAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT

10/21/2011 1:19 PM

619

Similar litigation against U.S. chemical companies by 13,000 banana
workers in six countries was settled for more than $50 million.247
DBCP litigation also has been brought in Nicaraguan courts, with
successful plaintiffs relying on U.S. courts to enforce their claims. Under
Special Law 364 enacted in 2001 to make it easier for plaintiffs to
recover for exposure to DBCP, Nicaraguan courts awarded more than
$2.1 billion in damages to plaintiffs.248 As described by Los Angeles
Superior Court Judge Victoria Chaney, under this law “essentially
anyone who obtains two required lab reports stating he is sterile and who
claims to have been exposed to DBCP on a banana farm is entitled to
damages; causation and liability are conclusively presumed.”249 Under
special procedures prescribed by the law, the defendant must post a $15
million bond and “has just 3 days to answer the complaint, the parties
have 8 days to present evidence, and the court has 3 days to issue a
judgment.”250
The law made DBCP claims so attractive that widespread fraud
occurred. Judge Chaney ultimately dismissed several DBCP lawsuits
brought in Los Angeles Superior Court against the Dole Food Company
because of fraud occurring in Nicaragua.251 The judge found the cases to
be tainted by pervasive fraud by lawyers and others in Nicaragua who
recruited plaintiffs who had never worked on banana plantations,
falsified lab reports, and sought to intimidate witnesses who helped
expose the fraud.252 Judge Chaney dismissed Tellez v. Dole,253 a 2007

http://www.dallasobserver.com/content/printVersion/285584.
247. DAVIS, supra note 242, at 200.
248. See Steve Stecklow, Fraud by Trial Lawyers Taints Wave of Pesticide Lawsuits, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 19, 2009, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125061508138340501.html
(referencing a “legal system that heavily favored plaintiffs” in describing the $2.1 billion in
judgments); Edvard Pettersson, Dole Doesn’t Have to Pay Nicaraguan Verdict, U.S. Judge Rules,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5nlMjavvtrM (referencing Special
Law 364).
249. Mejia v. Dole Food Co., No. BC340049, slip. op. at 23 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 17, 2009)
(providing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting order terminating Mejia and
Rivera cases for fraud on the court), available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-Dole_Chaney_ruling.pdf.
250. Id.
251. Stecklow, supra note 248.
252. Id.
253. Press Release, Dole Food Co., Los Angeles Superior Court Vacates Judgment and Dismisses
Fraudulent Lawsuit Brought by Nicaraguans Claiming to Have Been Banana Workers (July 15,
2010),
http://www.dole.com/CompanyInformation/PressReleases/PressReleaseDetails/tabid/1268/Default.a
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case, which awarded six plaintiffs $2.3 million for DBCP exposure.254
The drama surrounding the case included accusations of witness
tampering and threats against witnesses, which were believed to have
originated in Nicaragua.255 Judge Chaney based her dismissal on the
“fraudulent conduct by plaintiffs’ lawyers and their agents [which] led to
Dole being unable to properly defend itself from the claims.”256 This
case marked the final DBCP case brought in Los Angeles court by
Nicaraguan plaintiffs against Dole.257 In light of Judge Chaney’s
conclusions concerning pervasive fraud in Nicaragua, it is unlikely
Nicaraguan DBCP judgments will be enforced by U.S. courts. However,
Judge Chaney did specifically state that her conclusions only applied to
cases involving Nicaraguan plaintiffs and that no evidence of fraud had
been presented involving DBCP plaintiffs from any other country.258
Like the Chevron litigation in Ecuador, the DBCP cases have
spawned their own legal sparring over a pro-plaintiff documentary film
called BANANAS!*.259 In 2009, Dole filed suit against the producers of
the film arguing that it defamed the company.260 Four months after filing
the defamation litigation, Dole agreed to drop the lawsuit.261 However, a
Los Angeles court ordered the company to pay the defendants $200,000
in legal fees pursuant to a California law designed to discourage SLAPP
suits.262
spx?contentid=11722.
254. Richard Clough, Dole Proposes New Settlements, L.A. BUS. J. (May 31, 2010),
http://www.labusinessjournal.com/news/2010/may/31/dole-proposes-new-settlements/, available at
2010 WLNR 12198414.
255. Anthony McCartney, LA Judge in Banana Workers Case Cites Threats, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(June 7, 2010).
256. Victoria Kim, Judge Cites Fraud, Throws Out Award to Dole Workers, L.A. TIMES, July 16,
2010, at AA3 [hereinafter Judge Cites Fraud] (stating also that “massive fraud [had been]
perpetrated on this court”); see also Victoria Kim, Judge Throws Out Verdict Awarding Millions To
Dole Workers, L. A. TIMES (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter Judge Throws Out Verdict],
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/16/local/la-me-dole-20100716.
257. Kim, Judge Cites Fraud, supra note 256, at AA3; Kim, Judge Throws Out Verdict, supra
note 256.
258. Mejia v. Dole Food Co., No. BC340049, slip. op. at 24 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 17, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-Dole_Chaney_ruling.pdf.
259. Gina Keating, Dole Sues “Bananas” Documentary Maker, REUTERS (July, 8, 2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5677C520090708.
260. Id.
261. Deborah Crowe, Dole Drops Lawsuit Against Bananas! Filmmaker, L.A. BUS. J., Oct. 15,
2009.
262. Matthew Belloni, Dole Hit with $200,000 Penalty Over Movie Lawsuit, REUTERS (Nov. 29,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/29/us-dole-idUSTRE6AS0S020101129. SLAPP
suits are lawsuits brought to discourage members of the public from criticizing businesses, with
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The Trafigura Litigation

One final example of transnational litigation is the Trafigura toxic
waste disposal lawsuit, which demonstrates that even foreign
corporations may not be able to conceal the environmental consequences
of their activities in some remote corner of the world. As countries in the
developed world began to regulate toxic waste disposal more stringently
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, often the developing world served as a
dumping ground for toxic waste from industrialized countries. In August
1986, the Khian Sea, a ship loaded with 15,000 tons of ash from
incinerators in Philadelphia, sought to dump its cargo on a beach in the
Bahamas but was turned away by Bahamian authorities.263 For the next
sixteen months the ship sailed in search of a destination for its cargo,
only to be turned away by six different countries. In January 1988, 3000
tons of the ash were dumped in Haiti before the operation was
stopped.264 The ship was then turned away from five more countries
before the rest of the ash disappeared into the Indian Ocean somewhere
between Singapore and Sri Lanka, after the ship had been renamed to
conceal its identity.265
When a ship named the Karin B, which was operated by an Italian
company, dumped 8000 drums of toxic waste including PCBs in a
Nigerian fishing village in 1988, Nigeria recalled its ambassador to Italy
and forced the waste to be taken back to Italy.266 These and other
incidents gave impetus to the adoption in 1989 of the Basel Convention
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal (“Convention”).267 While the Convention bans hazardous
waste exports unless the government of the receiving country has

SLAPP standing for “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.” See generally GEORGE W.
PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 212–22 (1984)
(discussing the authors’ study into 241 SLAPP cases).
263. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY
1184 (6th ed. 2009).
264. Id.
265. Jerry Schwartz, The Trash that Wouldn’t Be Thrown Away, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 2,
2000, available at Factiva, Doc. No. aprs000020010803dw930i2bu.
266. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 263.
267. U.N. Environment Programme Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Global Convention on
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, Basel, Switz., Mar. 20–22, 1989,
Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Global Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, Resolution 2, UNEP/IG.80/L.12, reprinted in 28
I.L.M. 649, 656 (1989).
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consented to receiving the waste,268 it does not establish any regime of
liability for harm caused by waste dumping.269
In August 2006, a ship operated by the British trading firm Trafigura
dumped hundreds of tons of toxic waste in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, after
failing in an effort to offload the waste in the Netherlands.270 Exposure
to the waste allegedly resulted in some deaths and caused severe health
problems in thousands of the people exposed to it.271 After the company
reached a $198 million settlement with the government of Côte d’Ivoire
for cleanup costs,272 a lawsuit was brought against it in London on behalf
of 31,000 Côte d’Ivoire residents.273 The class action sought $160
million in damages for health problems caused by exposure to the waste.
Trafigura defended by blaming the waste dump on an “independent
contractor.”274 It aggressively threatened to bring libel actions against
media outlets that published reports favorable to the claimants.275 Yet
when The Guardian revealed emails allegedly showing efforts by
Trafigura to cover up its involvement in the waste dumping, Trafigura
quickly announced in September 2009 that it had reached a £30 million
settlement with attorneys for the plaintiffs.276 While attorneys for the
plaintiffs expressed approval of the settlement, Greenpeace argued that

268. Id. at Art. 6, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. at 664 (setting out notification rules).
269. Id. at Art. 12, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. at 668 (directing parties to adopt, “as soon as
practicable, . . . rules and procedures in the field of liability . . . .”).
270. David Leigh, Oil Trader Trafigura Faces Criminal Charges Over Attempt to Offload Toxic
Waste in Netherlands, GUARDIAN, June 2, 2010, at 21 [hereinafter Oil Trader]; see also David
Leigh, Trafigura Faces Criminal Charges Over Attempt to Offload Toxic Waste, GUARDIAN (June
1, 2010, 8:09 PM) [hereinafter Trafigura], http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/01/trafiguratrial-toxic-waste-netherlands.
271. David Leigh, Dirty Business – How UK Firm Covered Up Toxic Oil Disaster, GUARDIAN,
Sept. 17. 2009, at 1 [hereinafter Oil Disaster]; see also David Leigh, How UK Oil Company
Trafigura Tried to Cover Up African Pollution Disaster, GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2009, 10:08 PM)
[hereinafter African Pollution], http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/16/trafigura-africanpollution-disaster.
272. The $198 million settlement Trafigura paid the Ivorian government in 2007 exempted the
company from any legal proceedings in Côte d’Ivoire. Gilbert Kreijger, Dutch Court Fines
Trafigura
Over
Ivory
Coast
Waste,
REUTERS,
July
23,
2010,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE66M1SB20100723. Trafigura, however, denied any
wrongdoing when it paid the settlement. Id.
273. Editorial, Oil Waste Scandal: The Polluter Must Pay, GUARDIAN, Sept. 17, 2009, at 30,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/sep/17/compensation-trafigura-victory.
274. Id.
275. Oil Disaster, supra note 271, at 1; African Pollution, supra note 271.
276. David Leigh, Greenpeace Continues Pursuit of Oil Trader Over Toxic Waste, GUARDIAN,
Sept. 21, 2009, at 12, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/20/greenpeacetrafigura-toxic-waste.
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the company should still be prosecuted for manslaughter for deaths
caused by the waste dumping.277
Trafigura was criminally prosecuted in the Netherlands for the
company’s actions in Amsterdam prior to the 2006 waste dumping in
Abidjan. 278 Prosecutors charged that Trafigura attempted to dispose of
waste cheaply in the Netherlands by concealing the toxicity of the waste
in order to avoid specialized dumping procedures.279 Complaints from
surrounding residents led Trafigura to pump the waste back on board the
tanker after an initial attempt to dispose of it.280 The criminal
prosecution in the Dutch court was brought against Trafigura, the
Ukrainian captain of the tanker, which carried and disposed of the waste,
and a London-based junior Trafigura employee. 281 All defendants were
convicted, and the Dutch court fined the company €1 million for
breaking European regulations on waste export to developing countries,
harming the environment, and concealing “the harmful nature of the
waste.”282 The court sentenced the Ukrainian tanker captain to a fivemonth, suspended jail sentence for concealing the waste’s harmful
nature and for forgery in reporting the waste to Dutch authorities.283 The
junior Trafigura employee was sentenced to a six-month suspended jail
sentence and a €25,000 fine for concealment of the waste’s harmful
nature.284 However, the City of Amsterdam was acquitted; although the
city oversees the port and had been charged with “leaving dangerous
waste in the hands of someone not qualified to process it,”285 the court
found that the port was acting as a public body and therefore immune
from prosecution.286 Additional charges against Trafigura’s chief
executive officer were dropped,287 although these charges may be re277. Id.
278. Oil Trader, supra note 270, at 21; Trafigura, supra note 270.
279. Oil Trader, supra note 270, at 21; Trafigura, supra note 270.
280. Oil Trader, supra note 270, at 21; Trafigura, supra note 270.
281. See Oil Trader, supra note 270, at 21; Trafigura, supra note 270.
282. Kreijger, supra note 272.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See Oil Trader, supra note 270, at 21; Trafigura, supra note 270.
286. Kreijger, supra note 272.
287. See Oil Trader, supra note 270, at 21 (“It has been ruled that the company’s chief executive,
Claude Dauphin, should not face personal charges.”); Trafigura, supra note 270 (same). But see
Jurjen van de Pol, Trafigura CEO Ruling Should be Re-examined in Ivory Coast Case, Court Says,
BLOOMBERG (July 6, 2010, 5:08 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-06/trafigura-ceoruling-on-ivory-coast-must-be-reviewed-dutch-top-court-says.html (describing how the issue of
whether Trafigura Beheer BV Chief Executive Officer Claude Dauphin also should be prosecuted
was being reviewed by a Dutch court).
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examined.288 Shortly after the Dutch court’s ruling, Trafigura indicated
that it would “study the court’s findings with a view to appeal.”289
Additionally, Trafigura maintained its employee’s innocence and stated
it would continue to provide legal assistance to the employee.290
The Trafigura litigation demonstrates that corporations based in the
United States are not the only multinationals to be subject to
transnational litigation as a result of their operations abroad. Companies
with global operations no longer can be confident that they can conceal
the environmental consequences of their activities in some remote corner
of the world. Global networks of activists are now able to question
corporate activities even in remote areas and to seek legal redress for
environmental harm. Even if the lawsuits do not succeed, the harsh light
of publicity may serve as a catalyst for changes in corporate behavior.
For this reason, NGOs increasingly are turning to transparency and
disclosure strategies, as discussed below.
IV. PRIVATE TRANSNATIONAL TRANSPARENCY
INITIATIVES
Private parties are now playing a major role in the emergence of
global environmental law, which features “new actors, new institutions,
and new rules” that are very different from international law’s traditional
focus on relations between sovereign states.291 Among the most striking
recent developments is the growth of private initiatives to promote
increased transparency concerning the activities of multinational
corporations and their environmental impacts. This Part discusses three
such initiatives: (1) the Equator Principles that require environmental
assessments for major development projects funded by multinational
banks, (2) the Palm Oil Roundtable, and (3) efforts to “green the supply
chains” of major corporations.

288. Kreijger, supra note 272.
289. Probo Koala Updates, TRAFIGURA (July 23, 2010),
http://web.archive.org/web/20100725164253/http://www.trafigura.com/our_news/probo_koala_upd
ates.aspx#nrN78o5pUE34 (accessed by searching
“http://www.trafigura.com/our_news/probo_koala_updates.aspx” on the Internet Archive’s main
page—http://www.archive.org—and selecting the snapshot from July 25, 2010).
290. Id.
291. This was noted a decade ago by Philippe Sands in his discussion of the evolution of
international law in Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 527, 556 (2001).
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The Equator Principles

On June 4, 2003, a group of large banks that finance major
development projects announced the adoption of the Equator Principles.
These principles commit the banks to follow common standards for
assessing the environmental risks of the projects they fund and to require
environmental management plans for controlling those risks. These
standards are based on the practices of the World Bank’s International
Finance Corporation. There are currently seventy Equator Principle
Financial Institutions (EPFIs).292 These seventy EPFIs provide more than
eighty percent of project financing in developing nations.293
Because of the lack of transparency in both the Equator Principles and
the banking industry, it is difficult to ascertain whether banks are only
financing projects that are environmentally sound and rejecting the
others.294 It is also difficult to determine whether banks are requiring
projects to be amended before providing financing.295 The Equator
Principles have no external mechanism for compliance or accountability,
which leads many critics to believe that the Principles mean little.296 One
method of addressing this concern is a new requirement that clients with
projects that have significant environmental and social concerns create a
grievance mechanism for the affected community to voice those
concerns.297 “Informal regulators” (i.e., NGOs and civil society) are
using the grievance mechanism, as well as public shame, to ensure that
EPFIs comply with the Principles. 298
One example of an NGO utilizing a grievance mechanism deals with
the financing of the Finnish company Metsa-Botnia’s Orion paper-pulp

292. About the Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS’N, http://www.equatorprinciples.com/index.php/about-ep/about (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
293. Steven Ferrey, The Failure of International Global Warming Regulation to Promote Needed
Renewable Energy, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 67, 113 (2010).
294. Andrew Hardenbrook, Note, The Equator Principles: The Private Financial Sector’s
Attempt at Environmental Responsibility, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 197, 227 (2007).
295. Id.
296. Natalie L. Bridgeman & David B. Hunter, Narrowing the Accountability Gap: Toward a
New Foreign Investor Accountability Mechanism, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 187, 220–21
(2008).
297. Id. at 217.
298. See id. at 219 (“For example, at an October 2007 seminar on sustainable finance sponsored
by HSBC Mexico, UNEP Finance Initiative, and the Mexican Government’s National Ecological
Institute, a presenter from ABN AMRO showed photos of protestors and NGO campaign ads in her
presentation while making the point that ‘informal regulators’ . . . are requiring compliance with
voluntary standards such as the Equator Principles.”).
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mill in Uruguay.299 The Orion paper-pulp mill project in Uruguay was a
significant project estimated to increase the GDP of Uruguay by two
percent per year.300 Argentina, however, opposed the project, arguing
that it would pollute the River Uruguay—shared by both countries—
while bringing no financial benefit to Argentina.301 The Centre for
Human Rights and Environment (CEDHA) invoked the Equator
Principles in its campaign to stop financing for the project.302 The
CEDHA complaint stated that the project did not take into consideration
serious harm to local communities and valuable natural resources.303
While CEDHA was not able to stop the construction of the mill,304 it did
succeed in convincing ING to withdraw from the $480 million project,
shocking the project finance world.305 ING was known as a leading
advocate for the Equator Principles, and many consider the negative
publicity a major reason for the company’s decision to withdraw.306
However, after ING withdrew, Calyon, another bank that had signed
onto the Equator Principles, stepped in to finance the project.307
B.

Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil

Another important set of private initiatives have sought to reduce
environmental destruction caused by palm oil production. In 2009, world
vegetable oil production totaled about 150 million tons, approximately
forty million of which were palm oil.308 Although palm oil is entirely

299. Vivian Lee, Note, Enforcing the Equator Principles: An NGO’s Principled Effort to Stop the
Financing of a Paper Pulp Mill in Uruguay, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 354, 359–61 (2008).
300. U.S. Votes in Favor of Int’l Loan for Uruguay Pulpmill Project, U.S. FED. NEWS, Nov. 21,
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 20482976.
301. Lee, supra note 299, at 360.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 360–61.
304. See id. at 361 (noting that the project has been in operation since September 11, 2007).
305. Id. at 364; see also Letter from A. Cohen Stuart, ING Group, to J.D. Taillant, Ctr. for
Human Rights & Env’t, (Apr. 12, 2006), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20101202194025/http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_mil
ls/ing-pullout-letter-april-12-2006.pdf (accessed by searching
“http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_mills/ing-pullout-letter-april-12-2006.pdf” on
the Internet Archive’s main page—http://www.archive.org—and selecting the snapshot from Dec.
2, 2010) (indicating ING’s pullout from the Metsa-Botnia project).
306. “With or Without IFC Support”, Botnia’s Mill Goes Ahead, MERCOPRESS (June 14, 2006,
9:00 PM), http://en.mercopress.com/2006/06/14/with-or-without-ifc-support-botnia-s-mill-goesahead.
307. Lee, supra note 299, at 364.
308. Sustainable Palm Oil, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL,
http://www.rspo.org/?q=page/789 (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
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free of genetically modified (GM) plants and has the highest yield per
hectare of any oil, its production has significant environmental
consequences.309 Palm oil production destroys not only tropical forests,
310
but also peatland, whose destruction emits large amounts of stored
carbon dioxide.311 Palm oil is mainly produced in tropical areas of Asia,
Africa, and South America, and its production has generated extreme
deforestation in some areas.312 In May 2008, Unilever announced that it
would use only palm oil that was certified as sustainable by 2015, and it
would support the call for a moratorium for any further deforestation for
palm oil in Indonesia.313 Palm oil can be used as biofuel, and many palm
oil projects initially were funded as Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) projects and Joint Implementation (JI) projects pursuant to the
Kyoto Protocol.314 However, companies in the European market have
been turning away from funding these projects, due to their perceived
environmental harm and their consequent reputational risk.315
In 2001, the World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) began a dialogue to
promote sustainable palm oil production.316 This interchange led to an
informal discussion among Aarhus United UK Ltd., Gold Hope
Plantations Berhad, Migros, Malaysian Palm Oil Association,
Sainsbury’s, and Unilever in 2002.317 These organizations became the
foundation for the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO).318 Over
200 participants from sixteen countries attended the first official meeting
of the RSPO, which took place in Malaysia in August 2003.319 The
organizations adopted a Statement of Intent, a non-legally binding

309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Caitlin Randall, Carbon Market Takes Sides in Palm Oil Battle, CARBON FIN. (Nov. 20,
2007), http://www.carbonfinanceonline.com/index.cfm?section=features&id=10864&action=view&return=home.
312. Sustainable Palm Oil, supra note 308.
313. Letter from Gavin Neath, Senior Vice President, Unilever, to Marcel Silvius, Wetlands Int’l,
available at
http://wetlands.org/WatchRead/tabid/56/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/2145/PageID/1365/Def
ault.aspx (follow “Moratorium on deforestation on palm oil production” download hyperlink; then
open “Unilever letter”) (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
314. Randall, supra note 311.
315. Id.
316. History, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, http://www.rspo.org/?q=page/10 (last
visited Sept. 6, 2011).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
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expression of support for the RSPO.320 The RSPO was formally
established on April 8, 2004 under Article 60 of the Swiss Civil Code.321
Currently, there are 416 members, 85 affiliate members, and 36 supply
chain associates.322 Members are expected to develop and implement
plans of action within the framework of the Roundtable to promote
sustainable palm oil production, procurement, and consumption, as well
as to act transparently and regularly inform the RSPO of plans to
promote sustainable palm oil production, procurement, and
consumption.323
While the RSPO is helping to reduce the environmental impact of
palm oil production, severe deforestation problems remain.324 A report
from Wetlands International states that deforestation from palm oil
production is worse than previously expected.325 Between 2005 and
2010, about one-third (almost 353,000 hectares) of Malaysia’s total peat
swamps were cleared on the island of Borneo alone, according to the
report.326 Deforestation is significantly worse than the government
claimed.327 The total 510,000 hectares of peat swamps cleared in
Malaysia in this time period is conservatively estimated to have released
twenty million tons of carbon dioxide annually.328 While many palm oil
firms in the area are under pressure from the RSPO to produce
sustainably, many palm oil producers have avoided doing so due to the
strong palm oil demand from India and China.329 The Wetlands
International report calls for an end to incentives for biofuels production
in the European Union because it can increase demand for palm oil crops
and contribute to deforestation.330

320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Who is RSPO?, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, http://www.rspo.org/?q=page/9
(last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
323. RSPO Statutes, By-Laws and Code of Conduct: Art. 4.3, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE
PALM OIL, http://www.rspo.org/?q=page/896 (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
324. Tom Young, Report Targets Carbon Impact of Malaysian Palm Oil, BUSINESSGREEN (Feb.
2, 2011), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2023434/report-targets-carbon-impact-malaysianpalm-oil.
325. Id.
326. Press Release, Wetlands Int’l, New Figures: Palm Oil Destroys Malaysia’s Peatswamp
Forests Faster than Ever (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://www.wetlands.org/NewsandEvents/NewsPressreleases/tabid/60/articleType/ArticleView/artic
leId/2583/Default.aspx.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Young, supra note 324.
330. Id.
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Other private initiatives have sought to pressure companies and
organizations to reduce their use of non-sustainable palm oil. In
November 2007, Greenpeace published a report stating that major
companies, including Nestlé, Cargill, and Unilever, were contributing to
global warming through the use of non-sustainable palm oil.331 In
addition, in May 2011, two teenagers received national publicity for
their campaign to convince Girl Scouts of the USA to remove palm oil
from Girl Scout cookies.332 After major environmental groups endorsed
their crusade,333 the teenagers met with officials of the national
organization who promised to look for substitutes for palm oil in their
cookies.334
C.

NGO-Private Partnerships and Efforts to Promote “Green Supply
Chains”

A final example of an important private initiative is the formation of
environmentally conscious NGO-private partnerships. Companies that
adhere to high environmental standards while operating in the developed
world often are not as scrupulous in seeking to protect workers or the
environment when operating in developing countries. Some corporations
claim to be unaware of, or unable to prevent all, environmental or
worker safety problems in the companies that are part of their supply
chain.335 In recent years NGOs have worked to highlight these problems
in an effort to encourage companies to green their supply chains.336
These efforts have the potential to improve environmental and working
conditions in developed countries even when regulatory standards do not
require such improvements.
331. Laura Crowley, Unilever Commits to Sustainable Palm Oil, FOODNAVIGATOR.COM (May 2,
2008),
http://www.foodnavigator.com/Financial-Industry/Unilever-commits-to-sustainable-palmoil.
332. Julie Jargon, Cookie Crumbles for Girl Scouts, as Teens Launch Palm-Oil Crusade, WALL
ST. J., May 20, 2011, at A1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704281504576327733659636782.html.
333. Id.
334. Julie Jargon, Teens Await Resolution on Palm Oil in Cookies, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2011, at
A6; see also Julie Jargon, Girl Scouts Bake Up Plan To Tackle Cookie Worries, WALL ST. J. (May
24, 2011, 3:19 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303654804576343552112339650.html.
335. David Barboza, Reform Stalls in Chinese Factories, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2008, at C1;
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/business/worldbusiness/05sweatshop.html.
336. See Michele M. Betsill & Elisabeth Corell, NGO Influence in International Environmental
Negotiations: A Framework for Analysis, 1 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 65 (2001), available at
http://www.polisci.colostate.edu/fac/mb/NGO%20Influence.pdf (using as an example Greenpeace’s
success in pressuring Gerber to drop genetically modified products from its baby food).
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In January 2011, a coalition of thirty-four Chinese environmental
protection organizations led by the Beijing-based Institute of Public and
Environmental Affairs released a report assessing the environmental
health and safety records of Chinese companies that supply twenty-nine
multinational technology companies.337 Of the twenty-nine companies,
Apple’s suppliers placed last because of industrial pollution and
exposure of workers to health risks.338 In response, Apple released its
own Apple Supplier Responsibility Progress Report339 shortly before its
annual meeting with shareholders. The company disclosed that its own
audit of its suppliers had found instances of unsafe working conditions,
improper handling of toxic chemicals, and the use of underage labor by
some of its suppliers in China.340
In March 2011, a group of clothing manufacturers, retailers, and
environmental groups announced the formation of the Sustainable
Apparel Coalition that will assess the environmental impact of every
element of apparel production in order to provide consumers with
“sustainability scores” for each product.341 The thirty founding members
of the coalition include major retailers such as Wal-Mart and J.C. Penny,
the Environmental Defense Fund, and the EPA.342 Chairman of the new
coalition is the famous former mountain climber Rick Ridgeway, who
runs Patagonia’s sustainability efforts.343 The initial focus of the
Coalition will be to assist companies in greening their supply chains.344
Some large retailers, such as Wal-Mart, have pioneered their own
form of “retail regulation” by refusing to carry products that do not meet
various environmental criteria, for example, products that may contain
certain toxic substances.345 But the latest initiatives go a significant step

337. INST. OF PUB. & ENVTL. AFF., THE OTHER SIDE
http://www.ipe.org.cn/Upload/file/IT/Report-IT-Phase-Four-EN.pdf.

OF

APPLE

20

(2011),

338. See id. at 28.
339. APPLE INC., APPLE SUPPLIER RESPONSIBILITY: 2011 PROGRESS REPORT, 1 (2011),
http://images.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/pdf/Apple_SR_2011_Progress_Report.pdf.
340. Rob Schmitz, Apple Admits Child Labor Growing Problem at its China Factories,
MARKETPLACE (Feb. 15, 2011), http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/02/15/amapple-suppliers-face-accusations-of-child-labor-suicides/.
341. See The Sustainable Apparel Index, SUSTAINABLE APPAREL COALITION,
http://www.apparelcoalition.org/apparel-index (last visited June 2, 2011).
342. Tom Zeller Jr., Clothes Makers Join to Set ‘Green Score,’ N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at B1,
available http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/business/01apparel.html.
343. Press Release, Sustainable Apparel Coalition, Apparel Industry Leaders Launch Sustainable
Apparel Coalition (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.apparelcoalition.org/content/apparel-industry-leaderslaunch-sustainable-apparel-coalition.
344. See id.
345. Lyndsey Layton, Wal-Mart Turns to ‘Retail Regulation’ to Ban Flame Retardant, WASH.
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further by requiring companies to make affirmative inquiries concerning
conditions at their suppliers in developing countries.
Private and NGO efforts to encourage companies to research their
suppliers more carefully should be bolstered by provisions in the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank
Act).346 Section 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Act added a subsection to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) regarding conflict
minerals.347 The new provision requires disclosure to the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) of whether minerals used by companies
originated in the Democratic Republic of Congo or an adjoining
country.348 On December 15, 2010, the SEC proposed regulations
regarding conflict mineral disclosures.349 The four primary metals
covered by the legislation that are widely used by electronics
manufacturers are tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold.350 It is hoped that
these regulations will help mobilize companies to pay more attention to
the sources of the raw materials they use.351 The complexity of the
reporting will depend on the length of the chain-of-custody, or the
number of times the minerals exchange hands from extraction to
production.352
There have been varying reactions to the proposed regulations.353 The
electronics industry, which has dealt with conflict minerals issues for
several years,354 has been supportive. Hewlett-Packard, for example,
posted a letter of support, stating that this provision will provide much-

POST, Feb. 27, 2011, at A4.
346. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
Dodd–Frank Act].
347. 124 Stat. at § 1502.
348. Id. at § 1502(b).
349. Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed. Reg. 80948 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified 17 C.F.R.
pts. 229 & 249), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/34-63547.pdf.
350. Meggin Thwing Eastman & Jesse Shoemaker-Hopkins, Dodd-Frank Not Just About Banks:
Conflict Minerals Reporting Requirements Will Affect Chipmakers, Other Electronics Firms,
RISKMETRICS GROUP (Jan. 18, 2011, 11:12 AM), http://blog.riskmetrics.com/esg/2011/01/doddfrank-conflict-minerals.html.
351. See Dave Meyer, Using Materiality Analysis to Drive Corporate Social Responsibility &
Sustainability in the Supply Chain, KINAXIS SUPPLY CHAIN EXPERT COMMUNITY (Jan. 18, 2011,
11:32 PM), https://community.kinaxis.com/people/DRMeyer/blog/2011/01/18/using-materialityanalysis-to-drive-corporate-social-responsibility-sustainability-in-the-supply-chain.
352. Id.
353. See Brian Zabcik, Out of Africa: Dodd-Frank Tackles the Use of Conflict Minerals, CORP.
COUNS. (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202474894167.
354. Id.
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needed transparency in companies’ supply chains and reduce the use of
conflict minerals.355 Jewelers, however, have not been as enthusiastic.356
Patrick Dorsey, general counsel of Tiffany & Company, wrote a letter to
the SEC in September 2010, stating that the increasing use of recycled
metal by gold smelters makes tracing the origin of much of the gold
nearly impossible.357 Dorsey urged the SEC to define gold as a conflict
mineral only when there was reason to suspect that it might have
originated in the Democratic Republic of Congo or a neighboring
country.358 Others are criticizing the proposed regulations by arguing
that they are a departure from the SEC’s mission of protecting investors
and ensuring market integrity and that they inject foreign policy into
federal securities regulation.359
Section 1504 of the Dodd–Frank Act requires companies in extractive
industries to disclose to the SEC payments made to foreign governments
for the purpose of commercial development of oil, natural gas, or
minerals. This provision is designed to help make it harder for corrupt
foreign government officials to seek bribes because they would have to
be publicly disclosed by the company paying them. The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA),360 which prohibits bribery of foreign officials by
companies traded on U.S. stock exchanges,361 has been a major force in
spreading respect for the rule of law in developing countries.362
Enforcement of the FCPA makes it easier for companies to resist
solicitations for bribes and spreads respect for legal norms throughout
the supply chain of multinational enterprises. The transparency
provisions in the Dodd–Frank Act are likely to bolster efforts by NGOs

355. Press Release, Hewlett-Packard, HP Commends Enactment of Conflict Minerals Legislation,
(July 21, 2010), http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/press/2010/100721b.html.
356. Zabcik, supra note 353.
357. See Letter from Patrick B. Dorsey, Gen. Counsel, Tiffany & Co., to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-titlexv/specialized-disclosures/specializeddisclosures-17.pdf.
358. Id.
359. The Dodd-Frank Act: New Disclosure Requirements for Reporting Issuers Engaged in
Extractive Enterprises or Using Conflict Minerals, SHEARMAN & STERLING, LLP (Jul. 29, 2010),
http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/1304d12f-1229-46be-963bc45db1ae9c16/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/883bc9a2-3934-4633-9c38-7537baa09984/CM072910-New-Disclosure-Requirements-for-Reporting-Issuers-Engaged-in-Extractive-Ente.pdf.
360. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
361. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
362. See John Bussey, The Rule of Law Finds Its Way Abroad—However Painfully, WALL ST. J.,
June 24, 2011, at B1 (reporting that Trace International, a U.S. NGO that conducts FCPA
compliance training, has seen a surge in the number of companies in developing countries who are
using its services).
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and private companies to green supply chains and to spread respect for
legal norms such as the FCPA’s prohibition on bribery.
CONCLUSION
Globalization is having a profound impact on legal systems
throughout the world. International law traditionally focused primarily
on relations between states, but relations between states and private
multinational enterprises are becoming of central importance in a
globalized world. In an effort to more effectively control risks generated
by multinational enterprises, countries are borrowing regulatory
innovations from one another at a rapid rate and increasing efforts to
coordinate regulatory policy. Distinctions between domestic and
international law and between private and public law are diminishing in
force. The traditional “top-down” approach of negotiating multilateral
international agreements is giving way to a variety of “bottom-up”
initiatives that often involve greater participation by NGOs. The result is
the emergence of global law, which is not a set of globally harmonized
regulatory standards, but rather a term to describe the more complex set
of phenomena that are occurring in several fields of law, particularly
environmental law.
This Article explored various aspects of the emergence of global
environmental law and the changing path by which global environmental
norms are emerging. Even as efforts to achieve global consensus on a
successor to the Kyoto Protocol have faltered, regional responses to
climate change are alive and well. For example, regional and other
efforts to control air pollution from ships are progressing, and the
movement to ban the remaining uses of asbestos and leaded gasoline has
made global strides.
In response to perceived harm caused by the operations of
multinational corporations, plaintiffs are bringing transnational liability
litigation in both their own countries and in countries where such
corporations are headquartered. Liability awards, such as an Ecuadoran
court’s $18 billion judgment against the Chevron Corporation for oil
pollution in Ecuador, may speed the development of reciprocity norms
for transnational enforcement of environmental judgments. Even when
transnational litigation fails in court, it can shine a global spotlight on
environmentally destructive practices that companies would be wise to
abandon.
Finally, transparency initiatives promoted by coalitions of NGOs and
corporations also are a new and vibrant part of the complex architecture
of global environmental law. In an interconnected world of multinational
enterprises, companies no longer can claim ignorance of, or inability to
affect, occupational and environmental conditions in their supply chains
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even in remote parts of the world. Transparency works precisely because
of the emergence of global environmental norms; previously tolerated
risks, such as exposing the residents of developing countries to toxic
waste, are no longer tolerated in the developed world. In the emerging
world of global environmental law, the golden rule is extending its reach
to every corner of the planet.

